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FOREWORD
Thorbjørn Jagland
Secretary General of the Council of Europe
F ew things unite political scientists. Almost all agree, however, that democracies rarely go to war with each other. 
■ History teaches that denying people their rights is a recipe for upheaval. Societies which empower 
citizens, safeguard freedoms and keep proper checks on power are much more likely to enjoy lasting peace. 
■ This is why I talk about the need for democratic security – and it is underlined by the two biggest threats 
facing Europe today.
■ One is the surge in extremist violence. The recent terrorist shootings in Paris and Copenhagen were 
devastating but they were not the first. An atmosphere of hate and intolerance – of “us versus them” – now 
simmers within many of our communities. Xenophobia, populism and chauvinism are on the march and 
governments need to act. 
■ This means tough new sanctions for individuals who wish to cause harm. So the Council of Europe is 
developing the first international treaty to help states prosecute foreign terrorist fighters. Alone, however, new 
laws will not be enough. In the fight against radicalisation and extremism we also need political practices 
which foster tolerance and spread hope. We must teach our young people to live as enlightened citizens, at 
ease with diversity. In other words, we need a democratic response. 
■ The crisis in Ukraine is another case in point. Changing borders unilaterally and through force – as 
happened in Crimea – is never justified: it always leads to crisis and often war. Yet, recognising this should 
not prevent us from understanding that Ukraine’s problems did not begin or end with this act. Widespread 
corruption, a lack of independent institutions and the mismanagement of power weakened the country too. 
■ Kyiv sees this and has, rightly, acknowledged that a new political settlement must underpin lasting sta-
bility. A revised constitution will be needed to decentralise power, reform the judiciary and safeguard human 
rights. The Council of Europe will spare no effort in supporting this process: what happens next in Ukraine 
will have consequences well beyond its borders and across Europe. Stable nations need good neighbours. It 
is in the interest of all states to give these reforms their full support. 
■ Above all, this idea – of the need for successful, democratic neighbours – lies at the heart of my second 
report. In Europe we are only ever as secure as the states which surround us. Democratic security is a respon-
sibility which all nations share. 
■ This report therefore assesses the degree to which Council of Europe members are delivering democratic 
security, broken down into its five pillars: efficient and independent judiciary; free media; vibrant, influential 
civil society; legitimate democratic institutions; and inclusive societies. The picture varies from country to 
country but, taking Europe as a whole, the gaps are significant. Within each pillar key shortcomings have 
been identified, along with actions to resolve them. I believe that two priority areas for the Council of Europe’s 
work have emerged. 
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■ The first is widespread weaknesses within our judiciaries. This is now apparent in over a third of member 
states. In many cases only poor safeguards against corruption are in place and public trust in the system is 
weak. We must address this without delay. Honest and decent courts are the bedrock of any healthy democ-
racy. Without them executives cannot be restrained, faith in state authorities plummets, tension ensues and 
stability cannot be guaranteed. 
■ Second are the worsening conditions for free media. Our findings show that this problem is bigger, 
deeper and geographically wider than was previously understood. In many places the safety of journalists is 
deteriorating, with disproportionate tactics employed to suppress dissent. Even where the media landscape 
tends to be more open, overconcentration of ownership and arrangements which give incumbent politicians 
an unfair advantage are serious issues to contend with. In more and more places we see the media struggling 
to hold power to account. 
■ On both these fronts I am determined to see the Council of Europe redouble its efforts. This will include 
stepping up the training of judges and legal professionals in appropriate conduct, and expediting a pan- 
European action plan – only the second ever of its kind – to bring all member states together and put inde-
pendent judiciaries at the forefront of our work. We will also develop a three-year programme to improve 
protection provided to journalists, helping ensure that their safety receives the attention it deserves. Protecting 
the freedom of the media will be given a new, priority status in all of our co-operation programmes with our 
members. 
■ For these endeavours to work, however, they must be driven by real political will. I call on Europe’s lead-
ers to now take the lead: addressing their specific challenges while working together to advance democratic 
security across the continent. 
■ We already have the laws and practices needed to guide us: they are embodied in the European Convention 
on Human Rights and expressed through the decisions of our Court. Europe’s leaders will do their people a 
great service if they now recommit to both. 
■ Any states deliberately flouting their obligations under the Convention must stop. The same applies to 
mainstream political parties who publically denounce international human rights protections for their own 
partisan gain, giving succour to populists who do the same. Instead, we must seize the opportunity to head 
off new and dangerous threats by uniting behind the values and co-operation that have long been Europe’s 
great strength. 
■ In all this the Council of Europe will continue to be a faithful and active partner. Let us work together to 
guarantee stability across our continent, grounded in liberty and law.
 Thorbjørn Jagland
 Secretary General of the Council of Europe
WHAT IS DEMOCRATIC SECURITY?
Democratic security is an old idea. As early as the 1700s philosophers were arguing that, in nations 
governed by majority rule, people were far less likely 
to choose war as were their leaders, wary of bearing 
the blame for heavy losses. 
■ Experience over the last 300 years has over-
whelmingly supported this view. In a rare example of 
consensus among political scientists it is now widely 
accepted that democracies rarely, if ever, go to war 
with each other. Democratic practices equally protect 
states from internal strife. 
■ The reasons are threefold.
■ First, democratic systems provide for effective 
checks on executive power. Independent judiciaries 
GUIDE TO THE REPORT
This report assesses the extent to which the Council of Europe’s 47 member states are able to make the 
five pillars of democratic security a reality:
 3  efficient and independent judiciary;
 3  freedom of expression;
 3  freedom of assembly and association;
 3  functioning of democratic institutions;
 3  inclusive society and democratic citizenship.
■ Each pillar is explored in its own chapter and 
broken down into its key parameters. The list is not 
exhaustive, but includes the most important aspects 
of democratic security. The parameters have been 
selected in accordance with Council of Europe legal 
standards and norms and reflect the reports and rec-
ommendations of relevant Council of Europe institu-
tions and bodies. Notably this includes the Committee 
of Ministers, the European Court of Human Rights, 
the Parliamentary Assembly, the Congress of Local 
and Regional Authorities, as well as the reports and 
opinions by the Commissioner for Human Rights and 
the Venice Commission. 
■ Each parameter is accompanied by the detailed 
criteria by which compliance can be judged. In this way, 
the report can act as a yardstick for anyone wishing 
to assess the performance of an individual state. It 
should therefore be seen as much as a tool for on- 
going analysis as an evaluation of the current state 
of play. Where data is available these assessments are 
quantified. The lack of available and usable data has 
and strong parliaments prevent power from being 
abused, mismanaged and corrupted. Free media hold 
the whole system to account. 
■ Second, democracies foster tolerance, based on 
a shared set of civic values.  
■ Third, a genuine competition of ideas and plural-
ity of voices makes for more dynamic societies, better 
able to innovate in the face of new threats. 
■ “Hard security” continues to be vital – based on 
traditional models of deterrence and military capacity. 
Alone, however, it can no longer guarantee stability. 
Democratic norms and practices are vital foundations 
for lasting peace.
prevented formulating meaningful findings for some 
of the parameters.
■ For the purpose of our findings, we have set out 
the proportion of member states that can be classed 
under each parameter as: 
 3  Satisfactory: improving and stable
 3  Satisfactory: deteriorating
 3  Unsatisfactory: improving
 3  Unsatisfactory: stable
 3  Unsatisfactory: deteriorating 
■ This allows us to identify pan-European trends 
and priority areas for joint action, where key recom-
mendations have been made. 
■ The second report builds on and complements 
the first report, published last year. The methodolo-
gies are different: the first report identified the most 
pressing threats to democracy, human rights and the 
rule of law, based on the evidence of Council of Europe 
monitoring bodies. The second report, by contrast, 
measures the extent to which Europe’s states are pro-
viding the specific institutional and cultural building 
blocks needed for our shared democratic security. 
■ Together, the two provide a vital overview and a 
means of assessing individual states. We fully expect 
member states to continue implementing the recom-
mendations set out in the first report while simultane-
ously acting on the conclusions set out here. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
EFFICIENT AND INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY
■ Judiciaries are the cornerstone of any system of checks and balances. Yet our findings show that over 
a third of our member states are not guaranteeing sufficient standards of impartiality and independence. 
Given the importance of independent and impartial judiciaries as a prerequisite for virtually all elements of 
democratic security, these shortcomings have a multiplying effect and are therefore a matter of great concern.
■ In reality, the situation may be even more problematic. Given the data currently available, comparative 
assessments such as this one must measure judiciaries against purely legal and institutional criteria. However, 
other factors such as public perception, political culture and safeguards against corruption have a clear impact 
on the ability of courts and judges to command legitimacy and do their job. Until this information is available 
it is difficult to understand the full scale and nature of the problem. Widespread weaknesses are evident and 
an incomplete picture is limiting our ability to respond.
Proposed actions and recommendations
Europe-wide
 3  The Secretary General will request that the Consultative Council of European Judges and the Consultative 
Council of European Prosecutors urgently draft a comprehensive review of the main challenges for 
judicial impartiality and independence in member states. 
 3  The Secretary General will contact – by written procedure – all 47 member states in order to take stock 
of action taken to improve the independence, efficiency and responsibilities of judges, as set out in the 
appendix to the Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Committee of Ministers. 
 3  A thematic Council of Europe action plan on judicial independence and impartiality will thereafter be 
devised and – upon its adoption by the Committee of Ministers – expeditiously implemented.
Regional
 3  Regional programs to increase the independence, efficiency and professionalism of judicial systems in 
member states will be developed, strengthened and/or prolonged, such as the current joint Council of 
Europe–EU program on enhancing judicial reform in Eastern partnership countries (2013-15).
National
The Council of Europe’s bilateral work with member states, including through action plans, will focus on:
 3  providing guidance and expertise to support independent and efficient judiciaries;
 3  assessing the training needs of legal professionals with regard to independence, efficiency, transparency 
and quality;
 3  training on relevant legislation and practice for judges and prosecutors, representatives of the ministry 
of justice, judicial-legal councils or other similar bodies and the public prosecutor’s office;
 3  implementing lessons and standards contained in a new Council of Europe handbook on the ethical 
conduct of judges.
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FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
■ Despite gaps in systematic and comparable data, it is clear that the threats to freedom of expression are 
greater, deeper and geographically more widespread than has been previously understood. 
■ Over a third of member states are witnessing a deterioration in the safety of journalists and others per-
forming public watchdog functions. The misuse of anti-terror and defamation laws resulting in restrictions to 
freedom of expression has been observed, as well as disproportionate punishments handed out to journalists, 
including long prison sentences. A number of governments are now imposing or considering new powers 
to interfere with online content or to restrict access to it for reasons of national security, but without a clear 
assessment of the expected impact on freedom of expression.
■ Available data indicate that satisfactory levels of media independence are only achieved in a minority of 
states. Of the 29 for which data exists, media pluralism and diversity of content is unsatisfactory and deteri-
orating in a third. Even in countries where the media landscape is generally pluralistic, there are problems of 
concentration of ownership and a lack of transparency; insufficient funding for public broadcasting; interfer-
ence with editorial independence by media owners and politicians; and arrangements which unduly favour 
incumbent politicians.
Proposed actions and recommendations
Europe-wide
 3  Drawing on existing initiatives – notably the work of the Commissioner for Human Rights, PACE, DG1 
and the safety of journalists platform – the Council of Europe will develop a three-year Europe-wide 
programme to support national mechanisms to protect journalists, such as ombudsman institutions, 
press commissioners and non-governmental organisations. The goal of the programme will be to 
strengthen the capacities of such mechanisms, to promote networking and exchanges of experience in 
the area of safety of journalists and to raise the visibility of the issue in the member states.
 3  Accurate and up-to-date data on media ownership is an essential component of media pluralism and a 
safeguard against corruption. All member states should ensure they collect and make public sufficient 
information to identify the financial beneficiaries and ultimate owners of any media licensed to operate 
within their borders.
 3  Member states should implement effective regulation and monitor media concentration in order to 
encourage pluralism and independence. The Council of Europe will provide expertise on national legal 
and regulatory frameworks based on the case law of the Court (Article 10 ECHR) and Recommendation 
CM/Rec(2007)2 on media pluralism and diversity of media content.
 3  The Council of Europe will publish a review of states’ practices with regard to blocking, filtering and 
removing Internet content, identifying key trends, best practices and areas in need of action. Based on 
the case law of the Court and standards developed by the Committee of Ministers, the Council of Europe 
will offer assistance to member states to uphold freedom of expression online while guaranteeing the 
safety of citizens.
 3  The Council of Europe will improve its capacity to collect and process media-related information through 
existing activities and co-operation programmes.
National
The Council of Europe’s bilateral work with member states, including through action plans, will now make the 
promotion of free media and freedom of expression a priority, focusing on:
 3  practical steps to improve the safety of journalists and to raise the visibility of the issue in the member states;
 3  actions to address impunity for those responsible of crimes against journalists;
 3  co-operation with member states in preparing, assessing, reviewing and bringing in line with the European 
Convention on Human Rights any laws which place restrictions on freedom of expression. This includes 
legislation relating to defamation, hate speech and blasphemy, as well as laws aimed at protecting public 
order, morals or national security. They should duly take into account the requirements of Article 10 of 
the ECHR and the case-law of the Court. In particular, all laws limiting freedom of expression must respond 
to a pressing social need, be clearly and narrowly defined and be proportionate in scope and sanctions. 
Special attention will be given to the drafting and application of anti-terror laws, as well as legislation 
regulating access to official documents;
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 3  implementing Council of Europe standards on the independence of media regulatory authorities, the 
remit of public service broadcasters and media concentration;
 3  ensuring that legislation governing the use of the Internet adequately reflects state obligations under 
the European Convention on Human Rights and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.
FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
■ There is a lack of systematic information on the state of freedom of assembly and freedom of association 
across member states. However, it would appear that most member states have adopted legislation complying 
with Council of Europe standards to guarantee these rights.
■ Despite having appropriate legislation on the freedom of assembly, some states impose undue restric-
tions in practice. Moreover, in some instances, excessive force has been used to disperse demonstrations and 
to arrest demonstrators.
■ With regard to the freedom of association, there have been recent examples of legislative changes or 
proposals undermining or threatening the normal functioning and active engagement of non-governmental 
organisations. In a number of states, the formal mechanisms by which civil society groups are consulted are 
superficial and ineffective. In the worst cases, governments have attempted to control legitimate citizen initiatives.
Proposed actions and recommendations
Europe-wide
 3  The Council of Europe should prepare new guidelines to ensure meaningful civil participation in political 
decision making, based on best practice and shared standards.
 3  Building on the work begun by the Committee of Ministers – following the thematic debate on the “role 
and functioning of NGOs in the Council of Europe” – our own practices should be updated to ensure a 
greater voice for civil society within the Organisation through regular and formal opportunities to engage 
with the Committee of Ministers. This should also help to provide a clearer picture of the state of civil 
society, freedom of assembly and freedom of association across member states in order to identify 
appropriate policy responses.
 3  In consultation with the INGO Conference, the Secretary General will revise the guidelines on the partici-
patory status for INGOs within the Council of Europe and propose any necessary amendments to the rules.
National
The Council of Europe’s bilateral work with member states, including through action plans, will aim to: 
 3  align legislation, regulations and practice relating to peaceful assemblies and public events with the Council 
of Europe standards and requirements as set out in Article 11 of the ECHR and the case law of the Court;
 3  ensure active civil participation in decision-making processes, with formal safeguards in place in line 
with Council of Europe standards;
 3  ensure that NGOs enjoy clear and consistent legal status allowing them to carry out their democratic 
functions.
FUNCTIONING OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS
■ The majority of Council of Europe member states conducts elections in line with international standards. 
However, in a number of cases we have witnessed restrictive media environments, voter intimidation and 
limits on the freedoms of expression, assembly and association. In some states we have also noted a lack of 
effective opposition in the parliament, with opposition parties being either deliberately excluded or engaged 
in a prolonged boycott.
■ Even in states where the electoral administration proves to be professional and there is a high level 
of trust in the integrity of the electoral process, overall turnout in elections is decreasing. This is particularly 
relevant for certain categories of voters, such as women, national minorities and young people. More gener-
ally, a lack of clear rules has led to widespread concerns as to the arrangements and practices which unfairly 
favour incumbent politicians.
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Proposed actions and recommendations
Europe-wide
 3 In order to level the playing field between candidates and prevent the misuse of administrative resources 
by incumbents, the Council of Europe should provide common guidelines on media coverage and the 
financing of election campaigns. These will allow for greater scrutiny by civil society and raise awareness 
of the problem among all electoral stakeholders.
National
The Council of Europe’s bilateral work with member states, including through action plans, will aim to:
 3  review existing regulations and practice with regard to financing and running election campaigns, as 
well as the rules governing fair and impartial media coverage;
 3  improve the regulatory framework for election observation and enhance the capacity for the monitoring 
of domestic elections;
 3  introduce measures to encourage the participation of women, minorities and young people in the 
electoral process.
INCLUSIVE SOCIETIES AND DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP
■ Against the backdrop of prolonged austerity and in the climate of rising populism and intolerance, all 
states need to intensify their efforts to prevent divisions from forming or deepening in our societies. The con-
clusions and recommendations contained in the report “Living Together – Combining diversity and freedom 
in the 21st-century Europe” (May 2011) are highly relevant for our joint efforts in building inclusive societies.
■ Given the complexity of these issues, there is no “one-size-fits-all” solution. However, there are three 
fronts on which sustained action will enhance the resilience of all member states: effective protection against 
discrimination, the promotion of diversity in education and inclusive policies which will uphold social rights.
■ Less than half the member states have sufficient frameworks and effective policies to combat discrimina-
tion. In addition, some lack non-discrimination legislation of any kind in the field of civil and administrative law. 
In some member states, minority groups are denied full access to public services. This problem is particularly 
acute within the Roma community. While the right policies are often in place, a common problem is the lack 
of support or resources for their proper implementation.
■ Across many member states the skills required for democratic citizenship are not sufficiently reflected in 
formal curricula and there is a need to improve training among the teaching profession in this regard. 
■ The Council of Europe Action Plan to combat terrorism contains a range of measures covering education 
and youth activities precisely because in the long term these will be our most effective tools against radicalisation. 
■ The picture with regard to social rights is mixed across member states, but no state can afford to be 
complacent, particularly as vulnerable groups continue to shoulder the burden of austerity packages. Not 
all states have yet ratified the revised text of the European Social Charter; 33 member states have ratified the 
revised text of the European Social Charter and 15 member states have accepted the “collective complaints 
procedure” of the Charter. 
Proposed actions and recommendations
Europe-wide
 3  Implement the Council of Europe Action Plan to combat terrorism and radicalisation leading to terrorism 
(2015-2017). 
 3  Implement the Council of Europe agenda on Roma inclusion (2015-2019), with its three priority lines of 
action: tackling anti-Roma discrimination, introducing innovative models for inclusive policies for the 
most vulnerable and introduce best-practices for local-level solutions for the  social inclusion of Roma.
 3  Reinforce the follow up of the decisions and conclusions of the European Committee of Social Rights, as 
provided in the 2014 “Turin Process” Action Plan.
 3  Develop, within the Council of Europe, modalities for the systematic assessment of how national youth 
policies facilitate young people’s access to rights.
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National
The Council of Europe’s bilateral work with member states, including through action plans, will aim to: 
 3  bring anti-discrimination and integration measures and policies in line with relevant Council of Europe 
standards, notably through the establishment of national specialised bodies to combat racism and 
discrimination and the development of comprehensive integration policies;
 3  review and update curricula in line with provisions of the Charter for Education for Democratic Citizenship 
and Human Rights and support initiatives for the acquisition of competences for democratic culture by all;
 3  ensure implementation of the European Social Charter and a better follow-up of the conclusions and 
decisions of the European Committee of Social Rights;
 3  facilitate the ratification of Protocol No. 12 to the European Convention on Human Rights and the revised 
Charter.
COMMITMENT TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
■ None of the recommendations above will be effective without a clear and unequivocal commitment to 
and respect for the European Convention on Human Rights and the Strasbourg Court.
■ The Convention remains the only Europe-wide legal instrument setting commonly agreed standards and 
offering objective judicial review of compliance in all key areas of democratic security. It provides guidance 
for action at national level and subsidiary remedial action at European level.
■ At a time of ever lower levels of confidence between countries and the re-emergence of dividing lines 
across the continent, the importance of the Convention and the Court is greater than ever before. They provide 
the only universally applicable and commonly agreed framework for dialogue and co-operation on human 
rights, fundamental freedoms and democracy at a pan-European level.
■ The Convention system’s legal nature is a deterrent against emotional, politicised or populist actions 
and reactions.
■ For the system to work, it requires commitment from all parties. This commitment must be reflected not 
only in language, attitude and action but, first and foremost, in the execution of the decisions of the European 
Court of Human Rights.
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INTRODUCTION
Chapter 1 – Efficient and independent judiciary
T he rule of law depends on an independent and efficient legal system. The six key parameters for such a system are: legality and legal certainty, judicial independence, legal aid, efficiency, enforcement and lawyer professionalism.
■ This chapter sets out the minimum criteria for each, based on Council of Europe standards. Member states 
have been assessed according to Council of Europe official statistics, commentaries, reports and judgments.
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L egality and legal certainty are interdependent val-ues which form the bedrock of rule of law. 
■ Legality is based on Articles 5 and 7 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR): the 
rights to liberty and security and no punishment 
without law. 
■ Legal certainty is what allows individuals to 
regulate their own conduct within the law and to 
assess where state power has been applied arbitrarily.
■ The European Commission for Democracy 
through Law (Venice Commission) has broken down 
the concepts of legality and legal certainty into the 
key components below.
MEASUREMENT CRITERIA
Legality
Legal criteria
 3  The process for enacting law is transparent, 
accountable and democratic.
 3  The exercise of state power is authorised by law.
Institutional criteria
 3  The state acts on the basis of and in accordance 
with the law.
 3  The law is applied and enforced.
 3  Penalties are not applied unless a law has been 
violated.
 3  Exception clauses in the law of the state are only 
used in very narrowly defined circumstances.
LEGALITY AND 
LEGAL CERTAINTY
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Legal certainty
Legal criteria
 3  Laws and decisions are clear and precise, and 
formulated in sufficient detail to allow an indi-
vidual to regulate his or her conduct.
 3  The retroactivity of laws is prohibited.
 3  Legal discretion granted to the executive is lim-
ited by law.
 3  Laws do not contradict each other.
 3  Legislation can generally be implemented and 
is put into practice.
 3  Judicial decisions are binding at the last instance.
Institutional criteria
 3  Laws are publicly and easily accessible to ordi-
nary individuals.
 3  Like cases are treated alike.
 3  Final judgments by domestic courts are not 
called into question.
 3  Court case law is generally consistent and 
coherent.
 3  Legislative evaluation is practiced on a regular 
basis.
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FINDINGS
■ Legality and legal certainty are ensured legally 
and institutionally in a satisfactory way in a majority 
of member states. Taking into account a small group 
of states improving via recent significant reforms, 
a slightly positive overall trend can be observed. 
However, in one in four member states neither of 
these values is applied to a satisfactory manner and 
no trend towards significant improvements can be 
detected.  Further deterioration – mostly due to a 
lack of regulation or rapidly changing legislation – is 
also apparent in a small minority of states, which also 
stand out as the source of an overload of applications 
to the European Court of Human Rights.
LEGALITY & LEGAL CERTAINTY
■ The biggest outstanding problems related to 
legality and legal certainty concern the weak enforce-
ment of Court decisions, legislation leaving (or deliber-
ately allowing) sizeable scope for executive discretion, 
inconsistent or contradictory legal regulations and a 
lack of predictable jurisprudence.
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T he independence and impartiality of the judiciary and judges are fundamental to the rule of law; they are necessary for the separation of powers 
and for confidence in the justice system as a whole. 
This requirement for member states is enshrined in 
Article 6 of the ECHR. Judicial independence must be 
guaranteed at both institutional and individual level.
Institutional independence
■ Institutional independence plays a fundamental 
role for judicial systems, in particular with regard to 
other branches of government (“external” institu-
tional independence) and with regard to other organs 
within the institution, such as higher courts (“internal” 
institutional independence). In addition, judicial deci-
sions taken by a state power other than the judiciary, 
require an independent and impartial authority drawn 
in substantial part from the judiciary, authorised to 
make recommendations or express opinions which 
the relevant appointing authority follows in practice.
Individual independence
■ Judges must take decisions fairly and free of 
internal and external pressure. To be protected against 
undue pressure, judges should be independent and 
impartial and able to act without any restriction, 
improper influence, pressure, threat or interference, 
whether direct or indirect.
■ The Consultative Council of European Judges 
(CCJE) has highlighted that, as public trust in the 
judiciary is determined mainly by the behaviour of 
judges, it is “important to regulate this behaviour in 
a clear and transparent way.”  To ensure ethical be- 
haviour, principles of professional conduct should be 
established and laid down in judicial codes of ethics.
MEASUREMENT CRITERIA
Institutional independence
Legal criteria
 3  The judiciary is administratively and financially 
independent.
 3  The judiciary has independent decision-making 
power, and its decisions are respected.
 3  The judiciary has independence in determining 
jurisdiction.
Institutional criteria
 3  The judiciary is allocated sufficient funds to carry 
out its functions and has a role in how these 
funds are allocated.
 3  More than half of the judicial council is composed 
of judges who are chosen by their peers.
Individual independence
Legal criteria
 3  The length of judges’ terms of office is secured 
by law.
 3  Judges’ remuneration is set by law.
Institutional criteria
 3  Decisions on judges’ careers are taken inde-
pendently of the executive and legislative 
powers.
JUDICIAL  
INDEPENDENCE
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 3  Where law prescribes that another state power 
makes such decisions, an independent and 
impartial authority, drawn in large part from the 
judiciary,  makes recommendations, which are 
generally followed.
 3  Judges are adequately remunerated.
 3  Superior courts do not give instructions to lower 
courts.
 3  Judges are free to decide cases without 
interference.
 3  Decisions on the selection and promotion of 
judges are made on merits, transparently, based 
on objective criteria and are subject to review.
 3  Ethical principles of professional conduct are 
established for judges.
 3  Removal offences are precisely defined.
 3  Disciplinary proceedings respect the principle 
of judicial independence and are conducted 
under the responsibility of a self-governing body.
FINDINGS
■ The independence of the judiciary and judges 
is not being guaranteed in over a third of member 
states. Within this group, it is important to note that 
some states are making important improvements, for 
example regarding systemic changes to appointment 
procedures for judges, greater transparency in these 
procedures and judicial professionalism.1 Yet, in oth-
ers, the situation is clearly deteriorating, including 
as a result of the judiciary being manipulated for 
political ends.2  
■ Given the importance of independent and impar-
tial judiciaries as a prerequisite for virtually all elements 
of democratic security, these shortcomings have a 
multiplying effect and are therefore a matter of great 
concern. Among the most concerning shortcomings 
are: lack of independence and autonomy of judicial 
councils; varying degrees of executive pressure on 
the judiciary; opaque recruitment, nomination and 
promotion criteria for judges; and corruption.3
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
0
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
Unsatisfactory - deteriorating
Unsatisfactory - stable
Unsatisfactory - improving
Satisfactory - deteriorating
Satisfactory
63%
0%
15% 13%
9%
State of democracy, human rights and the rule of law in Europe  Page 22
A ccess to justice is an essential democratic right. Following Article 6 of the ECHR, governments have the obligation to provide legal aid where it 
is needed, taking into consideration: the importance 
of the case to the applicant; the complexity of the case; 
the capacity of individuals to represent themselves; the 
costs involved and the individual’s ability to bear them.
■ The Council of Europe has addressed this matter 
in detail in a number of different resolutions and rec-
ommendations adopted by the Committee of Ministers. 
Resolution 78 (8) on legal aid and advice requires 
states to set up an appropriate legal aid system and 
stipulates that legal aid should not be treated as “a 
charity to indigent persons but as an obligation of 
the community as a whole”. Extra-judicial legal-advice 
services should also be provided, which may serve a 
preventive function by avoiding unnecessary litiga-
tion. Court costs should also be considered, with an 
effective legal aid system providing possibilities for 
waiver, payment of or reduction of any fees. Public 
funding must be adequate, varied and efficiently 
used. National authorities should take active steps to 
ensure the public availability of information on what 
legal aid and assistance is available and appropriate 
and how to benefit from this right.
MEASUREMENT CRITERIA
Legal criteria
 3  The right to legal aid is guaranteed by law (where 
the circumstances of the case and/or of the 
applicant so require).
Institutional criteria
 3  The state offers an appropriate system of legal 
aid to provide effective access to justice to every-
one in its jurisdiction.
 3  Extra-judicial legal-advice services are 
provided.
 3  Where appropriate, procedures are simplified 
for persons to conduct cases themselves.
 3  An effective system is in place to reduce or waive 
court and other fees if they prevent access to 
justice.
 3  The legal aid system co-ordinates and includes 
organisations that wish to contribute to it.
 3  Legal aid is accessible, easy and fast for those 
who need it.
 3  Clear information is available on what legal aid 
and assistance is available and appropriate and 
on how to benefit from this right.
 3  Public expenditure on legal aid is adequate, 
diversified and efficiently used.
LEGAL AID
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FINDINGS
■ The provision of legal aid, both in its legal and 
institutional dimensions, is ensured satisfactorily in a 
majority of Council of Europe member states. There is 
also a positive trend in most of the countries where 
improvements are still needed. In particular, reforms 
in these countries have focused on more efficient 
legal aid laws, improvements in access to justice, the 
establishment of functioning legal aid agencies and on 
the increase of budgets. In a comparably small group 
of countries, a stable and unsatisfactory situation 
obtains. Some countries do not provide any effective 
legal aid whatsoever.
■ Despite an overall positive picture, there are a 
number of key impediments to the provision of legal 
aid which require immediate attention. In a number of 
member states, legal provisions and systems for pro-
viding legal aid are either still pending implementation 
or in need of major revisions; in some countries legal 
aid is discriminatory, with effective access denied to 
ethnic minorities or disabled people. In some cases, 
legal aid structures are underfunded or cumbersome 
bureaucratic procedures deter citizens from effective 
access to aid.4 In general, public awareness of the 
availability of legal aid needs to be improved.
LEGAL AID
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E fficiency of justice systems is vital for timely access to justice. States must “organise their legal sys-tems so as to allow the courts to comply with the 
requirements of Article 6 § 1 including that of trial 
within a ‘reasonable time’”.5 The European Court of 
Human Rights has regularly affirmed that “the reason- 
ableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed 
in the light of the particular circumstances of the case 
and having regard to the complexity of the case, the 
conduct of the parties and of the authorities, and the 
importance of what is at stake for the applicant in the 
litigation”.6 States are under the obligation to allocate 
sufficient resources to their justice systems to ensure 
that unacceptable delays to not occur.
■ Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the 
Committee of Ministers on judges: independence, 
efficiency and responsibilities states that “efficiency of 
judges and of judicial systems is a necessary condition 
for the protection of every person’s rights, compliance 
with the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention, 
legal certainty and public confidence in the rule of law.” 
It defines efficiency as “the delivery of quality decisions 
within a reasonable time following fair consideration 
of the issues.” Efficiency should be achieved “while 
protecting and respecting judges’ independence 
and impartiality”. It reiterates that, “each state should 
allocate adequate resources, facilities and equipment 
to the courts to enable them to function in accord-
ance with the standards laid down in Article 6 of the 
Convention and to enable judges to work efficiently”.
MEASUREMENT CRITERIA
Legal criteria
 3  Hearings take place within a reasonable time 
considering the circumstances of the case.
Institutional criteria
 3  State allocates adequate resources, facilities and 
equipment to the courts to enable them to func-
tion efficiently.
 3  Objectives of agencies are co-ordinated in the 
broader framework of ensuring accelerated 
justice.
 3  Regular monitoring activities are implemented 
to evaluate efficiency.
 3  Discretionary prosecution is encouraged where 
appropriate.
 3  Offences that are inherently minor are not dealt 
with in court.
 3  Simplified procedures are in place in respect of 
all types of legal proceedings.
 3  Civil and administrative courts are in sufficient 
number and geographically distributed to pro-
vide easy access for litigants.
EFFICIENCY
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FINDINGS
■ The overall efficiency of justice systems is still 
insufficient in just over half of the member states. 
However, in most of these countries improvements 
have been observed. For example, most member 
states have managed to speed up the processing of 
cases and significantly reduce the number of cases 
pending, while many have also developed the legal 
and institutional basis for improved efficiency via 
backlog-reduction plans or legislation on alterna-
tive dispute-settlement procedures. A small group of 
member states with stable and unsatisfactory levels 
of efficiency exists, however, where court proceed-
ings are excessively long, with significant numbers of 
cases pending, often exacerbated by an underfunded 
judicial system.
■ Long case timelines lead to an ever-greater num-
ber of applications to the European Court of Human 
Rights from some countries, due notably to the lack 
of resources, insufficient investment in professional 
education of judges and court clerks and outdated 
electronic and statistical court management.
EFFICIENCY
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E xecution of judgments handed down by courts is an integral part of the “trial” for the purposes of Article 6 of the ECHR, “the right to a fair trial”. 
Article 13, “the right to an effective remedy”, is also 
relevant to enforcement, stating that “everyone whose 
rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention 
are violated shall have an effective remedy before a 
national authority …”.
■ The Committee of Ministers Recommendation 
Rec(2003)17 defines enforcement as “the putting into 
effect of judicial decisions, and also other judicial or 
non-judicial enforceable titles in compliance with the 
law which compels the defendant to do, to refrain 
from doing or to pay what has been adjudged”. All 
enforcement must be carried out within a “clear legal 
framework”, detailed enough to provide legal cer-
tainty. It further states that “all persons who receive 
a final and binding court judgment have the right 
to its enforcement. The non-enforcement of such a 
judgment, or a delay in it taking effect, could render 
this right inoperative and illusory to the detriment 
of one party”.
■ Clarity is the most important element of enforce-
ment procedures, whether in defining enforceable 
titles or the rights, duties and entitlements of defend-
ants, claimants and third parties. The law should pro-
vide for the postponement of the enforcement process, 
which parties may request in order to protect their 
rights and interests; where appropriate, a right of 
review of judicial and non-judicial decisions made 
during the enforcement process may also be provided 
for. The role of enforcement agents must be prescribed 
by law. Enforcement officers must be appropriately 
trained in law and procedure and subject to scrutiny 
and monitoring.
MEASUREMENT CRITERIA
Legal criteria
 3  Enforcement is carried out within a “clear legal 
framework”, detailed enough to provide legal 
certainty.
 3  The law provides for a right for parties to request 
suspension of the enforcement process in order 
to protect their rights and interests and, where 
appropriate, a right of review of judicial and 
non-judicial decisions during the enforcement 
process.
Institutional criteria
 3  Enforcement is generally fair, swift, effective and 
proportionate.
 3  Enforcement strikes a balance between the 
needs of the claimant and the rights of the 
defendant.
 3  Access to information on the enforcement pro-
cess is available, and enforcement activities are 
foreseeable and transparent.
 3  Enforcement takes place within a reasonable 
period of time, with no interference by other 
powers of state, and no postponement except 
where provided for by law and subject to a 
judge’s assessment.
 3  Enforcement measures respect the principle of 
proportionality.
 3  Authorities supervise implementation and are 
held liable when judicial decisions are not 
implemented.
ENFORCEMENT
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 3  Potential parties are provided with information 
on the efficiency of enforcement services and 
procedures, with performance indicators, spec-
ified targets and likely time frames.
 3  An appropriate procedure, such as injunctions 
or fines, exists to seek execution of a decision in 
the event of non-implementation.
 3  Officials and other persons responsible for 
enforcement are properly trained and enforce-
ment procedures are regularly monitored.
FINDINGS
■ The enforcement of judicial decisions is unsatis-
factory in just under half of the member states of the 
Council of Europe. A positive trend to improvement 
can be observed in about half of this group, where, for 
example, funding has been increased for the introduc-
tion of bailiffs and other measures to ensure effective 
enforcement have been taken. However, a significant 
number of countries have made no progress in ensur-
ing enforcement, and a very small number exhibit 
systemic problems with high non-enforcement rates 
nearly rendering jurisdiction inoperative.7
■ Numerous problems require attention across 
many member states: the inefficiency of bailiffs, the 
lack of necessary funds for training enforcement 
officers or ensuring an equal number of them through-
out the territory of a member state, the lack of effec-
tive remedy systems for cases of non-execution and 
non-enforcement in special fields of jurisdiction (for 
example, restitution of property).
■ Regarding judgements of the European Court of 
Human Rights in particular, recent efforts to reduce 
the number of non-executed Court judgments have 
been successful. However, a significant number are 
still not being executed. In a few cases, domestic 
agendas and electoral rhetoric have politicised Court 
judgments, weakening the effort to jointly uphold 
commonly agreed standards for human rights across 
the continent.
ENFORCEMENT
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L awyer professionalism is essential to securing fair trial rights under Article 6 of the ECHR, which provides that everyone charged with a criminal 
offence is entitled to defend him- or herself in person 
or through legal assistance of his or her own choosing. 
Recommendation Rec(2000)21 on the freedom of 
exercise of the profession of lawyer states that law-
yers should be able to discharge their professional 
duties “without any improper restriction, influence, 
inducement, pressure, threats or interference, direct 
or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason”. It 
also identifies “a high standard of legal training and 
morality” as a prerequisite for entry into the profes-
sion, and argues in favour of continuing education 
for lawyers.
MEASUREMENT CRITERIA
Institutional criteria
 3  Lawyers can discharge their duties without 
improper interference.
 3  Entrants to the legal profession have appropriate 
education and training.
 3  The lawyers licensing body/professional associ-
ation is self-governing and independent from 
state and public pressure.
 3  Decisions on entry into the profession are made 
transparently, are based on merit and objective 
criteria and are subject to review on request by 
an independent and impartial judicial 
authority.
 3  A code of conduct for lawyers exists. Disciplinary 
measures for violation of its provisions are pro-
portional, respect the principles and rules of the 
ECHR and are subject to judicial review.
FINDINGS
■ A lack of available and usable data on lawyer 
professionalism has prevented the formulation of 
comparative findings across member states.
LAWYER 
PROFESSIONALISM
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EUROPE-WIDE
 3  The Secretary General will request that the Consultative Council of European 
Judges and the Consultative Council of European Prosecutors urgently draft 
a comprehensive review of the main challenges for judicial impartiality and 
independence in member states. 
 3  The Secretary General will contact – by written procedure – all 47 member states 
in order to take stock of action taken to improve the independence, efficiency 
and responsibilities of judges, as set out in the appendix to the Recommendation 
CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Committee of Ministers. 
 3  A thematic Council of Europe action plan on judicial independence and impartiality 
will thereafter be devised and – upon its adoption by the Committee of Ministers 
– expeditiously implemented.
REGIONAL
 3  Regional programmes to increase the independence, efficiency and professionalism 
of judicial systems in member states will be developed, strengthened and/
or prolonged, such as the current joint Council of Europe–EU programme on 
enhancing judicial reform in Eastern partnership countries (2013-15).
NATIONAL
The Council of Europe’s bilateral work with member states, including through action 
plans, will focus on:
 3  providing guidance and expertise to support independent and efficient judiciaries;
 3  assessing the training needs of legal professionals with regard to independence, 
efficiency, transparency and quality;
 3  training on relevant legislation and practice for judges and prosecutors, 
representatives of the ministry of justice, judicial-legal councils or other similar 
bodies and the public prosecutor’s office;
 3  implementing lessons and standards contained in a new Council of Europe 
handbook on the ethical conduct of judges.
PROPOSED ACTIONS  
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
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INTRODUCTION
Chapter 2 – Freedom of expression
T he right to freedom of expression enshrined in Article 10 of the ECHR is not only a fundamental right on its own, but is also necessary for the realisation of other human rights, including the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, the right to freedom of assembly and association, the right to vote 
and the right to education. It is a central means by which power is held to account and a necessary condition 
for tolerance, cultural diversity and living together. In these ways freedom of expression is essential for dem-
ocratic security.
■ The European Court of Human Rights has held that states should create an environment which allows 
for full participation in open debates, enabling everyone to express their opinions and ideas without fear, 
even if these are contrary to those defended by the authorities or by an important share of public opinion, or 
even if they shock or offend.
■ According to the jurisprudence of the Court and other Council of Europe standards, an enabling en- 
vironment for freedom of expression is understood to contain a number of essential features which collectively 
ensure the conditions for the protection and promotion of freedom of expression and public debate. These 
are (1) safety of journalists and others performing public watchdog functions; (2) protection from arbitrary 
application of the law; (3) media independence; (4) media pluralism and diversity, and (5) protection of free-
dom of expression on the Internet. Where assessments of these parameters have been limited by a lack of 
information, this has been clearly indicated. Key findings are provided for the states for which data is available.
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A free and vibrant media depends on journalists1 being able to scrutinise power free from interfer-ence or intimidation and without fear of violence, 
threats, arbitrary detention and imprisonment.2
■ Primarily, the state has a duty to protect journal-
ists’ right to life.3 Criminal-law systems must contain 
legislation to deter offences against journalists and 
law-enforcement measures to prevent, suppress and 
punish them. The state also has a duty to carry out 
effective investigations into alleged unlawful killings 
of journalists, to prevent and investigate torture and 
ill-treatment of journalists and to provide for an effec-
tive domestic remedy. The instigation of criminal or 
civil law proceedings against journalists or media must 
meet the requirements of Article 10 of the ECHR and 
must not be based on political motives.4
■ Protection of journalists’ sources and their right 
to gather news are essential for the exercise of their 
profession. The right to access information is of par-
ticular importance and obstacles or restrictions to 
this right must be prescribed by law and be narrowly 
restricted to what is necessary in a democratic soci-
ety. Finally, the disclosure of information regarding 
threats or harm to the public interest contributes to 
transparency, democratic accountability and the safety 
and well-being of citizens. Individuals who report on 
or disclose such information (whistle-blowers) must 
be protected in law and in practice.5
MEASUREMENT CRITERIA
 3  There is no violence against journalists or others 
who perform a public watchdog function.
 3  An effective criminal-law system is in place to 
protect them against threats and attacks.
 3  There are independent, prompt and effective 
investigations of alleged unlawful killings, torture 
or ill-treatment of journalists committed either 
by state or non-state actors.
 3  Prosecutors and courts deal adequately and in 
a timely manner with cases of threats or attacks 
on journalists.
 3  Journalists are not imprisoned and media outlets 
are not closed because of critical comment. There 
are no politically motivated prosecutions.
 3  Journalists are not subjected to verbal intimida-
tion led or condoned by authorities, or negative 
verbal rhetoric.
 3  The confidentiality of journalists’ sources is pro-
tected in law and in practice subject to clear and 
narrowly defined exceptions. Journalists are not 
subjected to surveillance by the state.
 3  Access to information and documents held by 
public authorities is guaranteed in law and in 
practice.
SAFETY OF JOURNALISTS 
AND OTHERS PERFORMING 
PUBLIC WATCHDOG 
FUNCTIONS
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 3  Journalists are not subjected to undue require-
ments by the state before they can work. Foreign 
journalists are not refused entry or work visas 
because of their potentially critical reports.
 3  A normative, institutional and judicial framework 
is in place to protect whistle-blowers.
FINDINGS
■ The safety of journalists from violence and threats, 
an enabling legal environment for their work and 
access to information held by public authorities are 
not satisfactorily guaranteed in almost half of mem-
ber states. Even where the situation is satisfactory, a 
significant number are regressing and over a third of 
states are experiencing a deterioration in protection 
for journalists.
■ Among the countries with environments which 
satisfy our criteria, this deterioration can in part be 
explained by a lack of proper implementation of 
existing legal frameworks, increased surveillance on 
journalists and mounting pressure to reveal confi-
dential sources.
■ Among the member states with an unsatisfactory 
rating, the negative trend is primarily due to violence 
against journalists,6 lax or non-existent prosecution 
of perpetrators and widespread politically motivated 
imprisonments.7
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L aws, judicial proceedings and other state meas-ures which restrict the right to freedom of expres-sion must meet the standards of Article 10, para-
graph 2, of the ECHR. They cannot be justified if their 
purpose is to prevent free and open public debates, 
legitimate criticism of public officials or the exposure 
of official wrongdoing and corruption. An arbitrary 
application of the law has a damaging effect on the 
exercise of the right to impart information and ideas 
and leads to self-censorship.
■ Defamation laws should be applied with restraint, 
both offline and online, and should have adequate 
safeguards for freedom of expression. The Court has 
consistently applied a high threshold of tolerance for 
criticism where politicians, members of the govern-
ment or heads of state are concerned. Furthermore, 
the Parliamentary Assembly and the Commissioner for 
Human Rights have called for the decriminalisation 
of defamation.8 
■ The Venice Commission and the Parliamentary 
Assembly have taken the view that pluralism, tolerance 
and broadmindedness in a democratic society should 
be protected through the defence of the right to hold 
specific beliefs or opinions, rather than by protecting 
belief systems from criticism. Laws which criminalise 
the spreading, incitement, promotion or justification of 
hatred and intolerance (including religious intolerance) 
must be clear as to their application and the restric-
tions they impose must be proportionate. Laws on 
public safety and national security, including those on 
anti-hooliganism, anti-extremism and anti-terrorism, 
may restrict the right to receive and impart information 
both offline and online. It is therefore necessary that 
such laws be accessible, unambiguous, drafted using 
narrow and precise definitions and have adequate 
safeguards against abuse.
MEASUREMENT CRITERIA
 3  Defamation laws allow for legitimate criticism 
and are not abused to influence the debate on 
issues of public interest.
 3  There are no criminal sanctions in defamation 
cases except where the rights of others have 
been seriously impaired.
 3  Awards of damages or legal costs in defamation 
proceedings are proportionate to the injury to 
reputation.
 3  Political or public officials do not enjoy a higher 
level of protection against criticism and insult 
than other people.
 3  Blasphemy is not a criminal offence. Religious 
insult is not a criminal offence except when there 
is an element of incitement to hatred as an essen-
tial component.
 3  Criminal laws on incitement to hatred and hate 
speech are clear and precise so as to enable 
individuals to regulate their conduct. These laws 
have adequate safeguards for freedom of 
expression.
 3  Laws restricting the right to information on 
grounds of public order or national security are 
accessible, clear and precise so as to enable 
individuals to regulate their conduct. These laws 
have adequate safeguards for freedom of 
expression.
PROTECTION FROM 
ARBITRARY APPLICATION 
OF THE LAW
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FINDINGS
■ The protection of journalists from the arbitrary 
application of defamation laws, including unjustified 
criminal sentences and fines, is satisfactorily handled 
in a majority of member states. Nonetheless, in a 
significant number there is a negative trend towards 
the arbitrary application of defamation laws. In some 
member states with an overall unsatisfying record on 
freedom of expression, unjustified sentences such as 
long imprisonment are imposed on journalists.
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■ Other declining trends in respect of an enabling 
legal environment for freedom of expression relate to 
the application of criminal laws and anti-terror laws. In 
some cases the wording of such laws is considered to 
be excessively broad and vaguely formulated, which in 
turn may lend itself to arbitrary action, discriminatory 
interpretation and unjustified restriction on the right 
to freedom of expression.
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U nder the principle of editorial independence,9 the government, regulatory bodies or com-mercial interests should not influence editorial 
decisions and the content of the press, broadcast or 
Internet-based media. Media should not be prevented 
from covering contentious issues in public debates 
such as corruption and should not be subjected to 
overly restricted guidelines or directives from state 
authorities with regard to news coverage. Media own-
ers should not exercise censorship over or excessively 
interfere with journalists’ stories.
■ The media licensing system should not interfere 
with the independence of the media and should take 
into account the specific nature of broadcasters, press 
and Internet-based media. In the broadcasting sector, 
regulation must be accessible, clear and precise and 
it is essential to have an independent regulatory sys-
tem guaranteed by a legal or other policy framework. 
Moreover, the law should guarantee the financial 
independence of the regulator.
■ The state should provide the legal, financial, tech-
nical and other means necessary to ensure genuine 
editorial independence and institutional autonomy 
of public-service broadcasters in order to remove 
any risk of political or economic interference. Public-
service broadcasters should have an independent 
and transparent system of governance, including 
a supervisory or decision-making authority whose 
autonomy is legally guaranteed.
■ Media self-regulation is important for preserving 
editorial independence, minimising state interference, 
promoting qualitative journalism and media account-
ability. Journalists should develop their own profes-
sional codes of ethics, which include a right of reply 
and correction or voluntary apologies by journalists. 
Media should also set up their own self-regulatory 
bodies, such as complaint commissions and ombud-
spersons. Their decisions should be implemented and 
recognised legally by courts.
MEASUREMENT CRITERIA
 3  Editorial independence of media from govern-
ment, media owners, political or commercial 
interests is guaranteed in law and in practice.
 3  The press, broadcast programmes and content 
of Internet-based media are not subject to cen-
sorship. There is no self-censorship in either 
private or state-owned media.
 3  Broadcasters are subject to licensing procedures 
which are open, transparent and impartial and 
decisions are public. The press and Internet-based 
media are not required to hold a licence which 
goes beyond business or tax registration.
 3  Broadcasters, the press and Internet-based media 
are not subject to arbitrary sanctions.
 3  The independence of the broadcasting regula-
tory system is guaranteed in law and in 
practice.
 3  Public-service broadcasting has editorial inde-
pendence, institutional autonomy, secure fund-
ing and adequate technical resources to be 
protected from political or economic 
interference.
 3  Media self-regulation is encouraged as a means 
of balancing media rights and responsibilities.
 3  Journalists have adequate working contracts with 
sufficient social protection so as not to compro-
mise their impartiality and independence.
MEDIA  
INDEPENDENCE
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FINDINGS
■ It is difficult to complete the overall picture of 
media independence across member states because 
of a lack of data for over a third of them. This in itself 
is a problem.
■ For the remaining two thirds only a minority are 
ensuring media independence in a satisfactory way. 
Even in these countries, however, problems such as a 
lack of funding for public broadcasting, interference 
with editorial independence by media owners and 
politicians and self-censorship occur frequently.
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■ The majority of member states for which infor-
mation is available rate as unsatisfactory. Problems 
include media content being influenced by the com-
mercial or political interests of owners or governments, 
commercial broadcasters displaying political biases, 
the politicisation of broadcasting regulatory bodies 
and government-dominated public broadcasters, and 
self-censorship by journalists.
■ In the significant group of countries rated as 
“unsatisfactory – deteriorating”, independence has 
been undermined by an increase in high fines and 
sanctions for media content.10 In some member states 
the state controls most media outlets and censors 
content both offline and online.
State of democracy, human rights and the rule of law in Europe  Page 40
M edia pluralism contributes to the development of informed societies where different voices can be heard. A major threat to media freedom 
today is the tendency for monopolies to form among 
traditional media across Europe.11
■ The requirements of Article 10 of the ECHR will 
be fully satisfied only if everyone can form his or her 
own opinion from diverse sources of information. 
Different societal groups, including cultural, linguistic, 
ethnic, religious or other minorities, should have the 
opportunity to receive and impart information, express 
themselves and exchange ideas.
■ The state should take measures to safeguard 
and promote a plural media landscape. This includes 
regulation to prevent or counteract excessive con-
centration of media ownership and to ensure that 
a sufficient variety of media outlets, belonging to a 
range of different owners, both private and public, is 
available to the public. Media should not be overly 
dependent on the state, political parties, big business, 
or other influential political actors for funding. The 
state should put in place rules on fair, transparent 
and non-discriminatory access to the technical infra-
structure for distribution. In particular during election 
campaigns, the state should facilitate the pluralistic 
expression of opinions through the media.
■ A multiplicity of means of communication is 
not a sufficient condition for pluralism and diversity 
of expression. Hence, the state should take measures 
to ensure that a sufficient variety of information, opin-
ions and programmes disseminated by the media is 
available to the public. Moreover, transparency of 
media ownership should also be ensured through 
information on bodies and persons participating in 
media structures.
■ Public-service media have a particular remit 
as they contribute to pluralistic public discussion, 
democratic participation and social cohesion and 
integration of all individuals, groups and communities. 
Public-service broadcasters should have their institu-
tional and financial independence guaranteed by the 
state and should offer a wide range of programmes 
and services to all sectors of the public.
MEASUREMENT CRITERIA
 3  The public has access to a sufficient variety of 
print, broadcast and Internet-based media that 
represent a wide range of political, social and 
cultural viewpoints, including foreign or inter-
national resources.
 3  Media concentration is addressed through effec-
tive regulation and monitored by state author-
ities vested with powers to act against concen-
tration. The public has access to information 
about media ownership and economic influence 
over media.
 3  Public-service media play an active role in pro-
moting social cohesion, integrating communities, 
all social groups, minorities, disabled persons 
and age groups.
 3  Media outlets represent diverse interests and 
groups within society, notably local communities 
and minorities.
 3  A plurality of media has fair and equal access to 
technical and commercial distribution channels 
and content providers have fair access to elec-
tronic communications networks.
MEDIA PLURALISM 
AND DIVERSITY
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 3  Media provide the public with a diversity of 
content capable of promoting a critical debate, 
with the participation of persons belonging to 
all communities and generations.
 3  Media, including public-service media, have fair 
and equal access to state advertising or 
subsidies.
 3  Political parties and candidates have fair and 
equal access to the media. Coverage of elections 
by broadcast media is fair, balanced and 
impartial.
FINDINGS
■ The data is not available for over a third of mem-
ber states. For the remaining two thirds, media plural-
ism and diversity of media content are not ensured in 
a satisfactory manner in the majority and the overall 
trend is negative. Even where action against concen-
tration of media ownership is on the agenda and in 
countries where the media landscape is generally plu-
ralistic, an increasing lack of ownership transparency 
and abuse of state advertising power raise concern.
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■ Media concentrations are also threatening inde-
pendent regional media and thereby limiting citizen 
participation a crucial element of pluralist democracy.12 
■ In countries rated as unsatisfactory, there are 
often numerous media outlets, but most are polit-
ically polarised and rely on financial support from 
their owners. In some cases, the representation of 
minority groups in the media continues to be weak. 
In severe and deteriorating cases, the entire media 
sector is under tight government control, which in 
turn limits the availability of diverse media content to 
the public. Moreover, the media is used by the state as 
a propaganda tool or as an instrument of incumbent 
candidates in election campaigns.13 
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T he Internet enables individuals to seek, receive and impart information across national bor-ders unlike any other media. The Court has 
observed that access to the Internet is intrinsic to 
the right to access information and, as a result, a right 
to unhindered Internet access should also be recog-
nised. Article 10 of the ECHR applies not only to the 
content of information, but also to the means of its 
dissemination, since any restriction imposed on the 
latter interferes with the right to receive and impart 
information. The state should take measures to ensure 
that the Internet is accessible and affordable, secure, 
reliable and ongoing. Everyone should benefit from 
the public-service value of the Internet, irrespective 
of age, gender, ethnic or social origin, including those 
on a low income, those in rural and geographically 
remote areas and those with special needs, for exam-
ple people with disabilities.14 
■ Restrictions on Internet content must meet the 
requirements of Article 10 in respect of legitimacy, 
necessity and proportionality. The state should refrain 
from applying nationwide general blocking and filter-
ing measures. If such measures are applied, it should 
be done on the basis of a decision by a judicial or inde-
pendent authority with due regard to proportionality.
■ Internet intermediaries who provide access, host-
ing, search or other services play a key role in the free 
flow of information and ideas on the Internet. Legal 
frameworks for intermediaries should recognise this 
role and contain safeguards for freedom of expres-
sion. Intermediaries themselves should establish clear 
and unambiguous terms of service in line with inter- 
national human rights norms and principles.
■ The collection of information about individuals’ 
communication and activities on the Internet and 
practices of monitoring and surveillance of Internet 
users not only constitute a violation of Article 8 of 
the ECHR, but also undermine people’s confidence in 
the Internet and have a negative effect on freedom 
of expression. Hence, a number of adequate and 
effective guarantees against abuse must be in place.15
MEASUREMENT CRITERIA
 3  The Internet is available, accessible and afford-
able to everyone, without discrimination.
 3  Restrictions on Internet content are applied only 
when they are prescribed by law, pursue legiti-
mate aims in accordance with Article 10 of the 
ECHR and are necessary in a democratic society. 
The law provides for sufficient safeguards against 
abuse, including control over the scope of restric-
tion and effective judicial review.
 3  Any determination of the scope of a measure to 
block or filter Internet content is done by a judi-
cial authority or an independent body with due 
regard to the proportionality of such a 
measure.
 3  The state does not block access to or usage of 
social media or other Internet platforms during 
specific events or on a permanent basis.
 3  Internet intermediaries do not monitor their 
users, whether for commercial, political or any 
other purposes.
PROTECTION OF FREEDOM 
OF EXPRESSION ON 
THE INTERNET
Chapter 2 – Freedom of expression
Chapter 2 – Freedom of expression   Page 43
 3  Internet intermediaries are not held responsible 
for the information disseminated via the tech-
nology they supply, except when they have 
knowledge of illegal content and activity and 
do not act expeditiously to remove it.
 3  Internet intermediaries do not censor content 
generated or transmitted by Internet users.
 3  There is no surveillance of Internet users’ com-
munications and activity on the Internet except 
when this is strictly in compliance with Article 
8 of the ECHR.
FINDINGS
■ Data relating to the protection of freedom of 
expression online is only available for 30% of states. 
There is therefore an information black hole with 
regard to an extremely important area of state activity, 
particularly in light of the current terror threats. It is 
extremely difficult to judge whether or not states are 
sufficiently protecting freedom of expression online 
while taking measures to protect national security.
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■ For the 30% of states for which information is 
available, it would appear that the overall trend is 
negative, even in countries with a generally satisfac-
tory rating, where an increase in surveillance activities 
can be observed or pressure is put on intermediaries, 
undermining the freedom of expression.
■ In the member states with an “unsatisfactory” 
rating, governments interfere with online content and 
frequently block media-related websites. In severe 
cases, laws on freedom of expression on the Internet 
have been adopted which do not meet the criteria on 
the quality of law as defined by the Court.16
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EUROPE-WIDE
 3  Drawing on existing initiatives – notably the work of the Commissioner for Human 
Rights, PACE, DG1 and the safety of journalists platform – the Council of Europe will 
develop a three-year Europe-wide programme to support national mechanisms 
to protect journalists, such as ombudsman institutions, press commissioners and 
non-governmental organisations. The goal of the programme will be to strengthen 
the capacities of such mechanisms, to promote networking and exchanges of 
experience in the area of safety of journalists and to raise the visibility of the 
issue in the member states.
 3  Accurate and up-to-date data on media ownership is an essential component of 
media pluralism and a safeguard against corruption. All member states should 
ensure they collect and make public sufficient information to identify the financial 
beneficiaries and ultimate owners of any media licensed to operate within their 
borders.
 3  Member states should implement effective regulation and monitor media 
concentration in order to encourage pluralism and independence. The Council 
of Europe will provide expertise on national legal and regulatory frameworks 
based on the case law of the ECHR (Article 10) and Recommendation 
CM/Rec(2007)2 on media pluralism and diversity of media content.
 3  The Council of Europe will publish a review of states’ practices with regard to 
blocking, filtering and removing Internet content, identifying key trends, best 
practices and areas in need of action. Based on the case law of the Court and 
standards developed by the Committee of Ministers, the Council of Europe will 
offer assistance to member states to uphold freedom of expression online while 
guaranteeing the safety of citizens.
 3  The Council of Europe will improve its capacity to collect and process media-
related information through existing activities and co-operation programmes.
PROPOSED ACTIONS  
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
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NATIONAL
  The Council of Europe’s bilateral work with member states, including through action 
plans, will now make the promotion of free media and freedom of expression a 
priority, focusing on:
 3  practical steps to improve the safety of journalists and to raise the visibility of 
the issue in the member states;
 3  actions to address impunity for those responsible of crimes against journalists;
 3  co-operation with member states in preparing, assessing, reviewing and bringing 
in line with the European Convention on Human Rights any laws which place 
restrictions on freedom of expression. This includes legislation relating to 
defamation, hate speech and blasphemy, as well as laws aimed at protecting 
public order, morals or national security. They should duly take into account the 
requirements of Article 10 of the ECHR and the case law of the Court. In particular, 
all laws limiting freedom of expression must respond to a pressing social need, 
be clearly and narrowly defined and be proportionate in scope and sanctions. 
Special attention will be given to the drafting and application of anti-terror laws, 
as well as legislation regulating access to official documents;
 3  implementing Council of Europe standards on the independence of media 
regulatory authorities, the remit of public-service broadcasters and media 
concentration;
 3  ensuring that legislation governing the use of Internet adequately reflects state 
obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights and the case law 
of the European Court of Human Rights.
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INTRODUCTION
Chapter 3 – Freedom of assembly and freedom of association
F reedom of assembly and freedom of association are inextricably linked to freedom of expression. Exercised together, they support an inclusive and effective system of checks and balances, in which power is held to account. A guaranteed enjoyment of these rights is a precondition for the active participation of civil 
society in decision making at all levels of government.1 
■ Countries with a high level of democratic security generally benefit from a vibrant, engaged civil society 
and recognise the overall value of public events and demonstrations, including those which criticise the state 
and raise concerns about human rights.
■ By contrast, freedom of assembly and association, along with freedom of expression, are among the 
first rights to be curtailed in countries where authoritarian governments are in power or where the level of 
democratic security is low. Insecurity is used as a pretext to dispense with these political rights and to enforce 
emergency laws – despite the fact that doing so will almost certainly undermine stability in the long term.
■ In Europe, freedom of assembly, association and expression are entrenched in all Council of Europe 
member states’ constitutions. Having the right laws, however, is not enough. The practical implementation 
of these freedoms largely depends on the enabling domestic legal and social environment.
■ On the basis of the information available and the sizeable gaps which exist, it is extremely difficult to 
make accurate comparative assessments over whether or not states are meeting these obligations. As a 
result the findings in this chapter have not been quantified but rather highlight key challenges based on the 
available evidence.
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L imits on the right to freedom of assembly must meet the requirements set out in Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights as well as 
in most national constitutions. As the European Court 
of Human Rights, the Venice Commission and OSCE/
ODIHR have repeatedly stated, peaceful assemblies 
may serve many purposes, including the expression 
of diverse, unpopular, shocking or minority opinions. 
States have the duty not only to refrain from interfering 
unduly with the exercise of the freedom of assembly, 
but also to put in place adequate mechanisms and 
procedures to ensure that it is enjoyed in practice 
and by all, without discrimination.
■ State authorities are entitled to require that 
reasonable and lawful regulations on public events, 
such as the system of prior notification, be respected 
and to impose sanctions for failure to do so. When 
rules are deliberately circumvented, it is reason- 
able to expect the authorities to react. However, the 
European Court of Human Rights and the Venice 
Commission have emphasised that the enforcement 
of these regulations cannot become an end in itself. 
The absence of prior authorisation and the ensuing 
“unlawfulness” of the action do not give “carte blanche” 
to the authorities; they are still restricted by the pro-
portionality requirement of Article 11. The authorities 
should always choose the least intrusive means of 
achieving the legitimate aims listed in Article 11 of 
the Convention. Content-based restrictions (visual 
or audible content of any message) should only be 
permissible in extreme cases, for example if there is 
an imminent threat of violence. Restrictions on time, 
place or manner of the assembly should not interfere 
with the message communicated, and the alternatives 
offered by the authorities should be reasonable and 
meet the principle that the assembly should take 
place “within sight and sound” of the target audience.
■ Freedom of assembly laws which allow for exces-
sive sanctions (both pecuniary and non-pecuniary) 
against administrative offences – in which there has 
been no use of violence – are intimidating and deter 
potential organisers of and participants in peaceful 
public events.
LEGAL GUARANTEES 
AND FAVOURABLE 
IMPLEMENTATION 
OF THE LAW
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MEASUREMENT CRITERIA
 3  There is an appropriate legal basis for the exercise 
of freedom of assembly, subordinating the pos-
sibility to limit it to respect for proportionality 
and appropriate procedures.
 3  The implementation of the legislation on free-
dom of assembly is guided by a presumption in 
favour of holding assemblies.
 3  The administrative authorities do not have exces-
sive discretionary powers, and procedures are 
carried out in accordance with the standards of 
good administration.
 3  The legislation provides for pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary sanctions for non-respect of the 
law on freedom of assembly that are propor-
tionate and non-discriminatory.
 3  Effective judicial review mechanisms are 
available.
 3  There are no or few judgments of the European 
Court of Human Rights that have found a viola-
tion of Article 11 of the Convention in respect 
of freedom of assembly.
FINDINGS
■ Most members of the Council of Europe have 
adopted legislation complying with the applicable 
standards, although in some states legislative changes 
are still needed.2 However, according to the data avail-
able on a limited number of Council of Europe member 
states, the implementation of freedom of assembly 
laws remains highly unsatisfactory in some coun-
tries, where a pattern has emerged showing that the 
administrative authorities are unreasonably insisting 
on changes to the locations of demonstrations (and 
offering alternative locations which are far from the 
city centre and not easily accessible).3,4 Such changes 
in location often prevent a demonstration from con-
veying the intended message to the intended tar-
get audience, and thus represent a disproportionate 
interference with the exercise of the right to peaceful 
assembly. Regrettably, “pride” marches continue to be 
banned in some countries.
■ At the local level, many municipalities are 
restricting the freedom of expression and assembly 
of minority groups, such as lesbians, gays, bisexuals 
and transgendered persons.5 
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T he policing of assemblies must be guided by the principles of legality, necessity, proportionality and non-discrimination. The state has the posi-
tive duty to take appropriate, timely and reasonable 
measures to ensure that peaceful assemblies may take 
place without participants fearing physical violence. 
Participants must be protected from any person or 
group that attempts to disrupt the assembly.
■ Managing and policing crowds at public events 
is a challenging exercise which requires a firm com-
mitment from the government to the rights of those 
attending as well as professional conduct by law- 
enforcement officials. The latter should be trained in 
crowd-management techniques in order to minimise 
the risks of physical harm during demonstrations, and 
they must also be made aware of their responsibilities 
to facilitate the exercise of freedom of assembly. Any 
use of force must be proportionate to the actual threats 
posed by the situation. Law-enforcement officials 
should dispose of a range of responses that enable a 
differentiated and proportionate use of force.
■ As the Commissioner for Human Rights has 
stated, misconduct of law-enforcement officials poses 
a direct threat to the rule of law. If the force used is 
illegal or disproportionate, civil and/or criminal liabil-
ity should ensue. Effective, independent and prompt 
investigation must be carried out when participants 
in a demonstration are physically injured or deprived 
of their life by law-enforcement officers.6 
■ Arbitrary arrests of peaceful demonstrators are 
in breach of the requirements of Article 11 of the 
Convention. The imposition of arbitrary and unrea-
sonably harsh sanctions has a intimidating effect on 
public protests.
■ As the Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR have 
stressed, the media also exercise a public watchdog 
role in respect of assemblies. Media professionals 
should therefore be guaranteed unimpeded access 
to assemblies and to the relevant policing operations.
MEASUREMENT CRITERIA
 3  The state ensures effective public security man-
agement at demonstrations.
 3  Excessive use of force is avoided.
 3  Law-enforcement officers are held accountable 
for abuses.
 3  Media professionals are guaranteed access to 
assemblies.
 3  There are no or few judgments of the Court 
finding a violation of Article 11 of the ECHR in 
respect to freedom of assembly.
FINDINGS
■ Data is available for only a few countries. However, 
cases of excessive force to disperse demonstrations 
and of arrests of peaceful demonstrators have 
occurred.7 Harsh sentences continue to be requested 
and imposed on peaceful demonstrators,8 and judicial 
review does not appear effective in some cases.9
■ In some instances, excessive force has also been 
used against journalists during rallies.
PROPER CONDUCT OF 
AUTHORITIES DURING 
PUBLIC EVENTS
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S tates should create an enabling environment, including a favourable legal framework, for the functioning of non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) as well as sustainable mechanisms for dialogue, 
consultation and co-operation between civil society 
and the authorities. The watchdog role of NGOs is 
described by the European Court of Human Rights as 
“essential in a democratic society”. Therefore, the Court 
considers that it is similar to the role of the press as 
defined in its established case law.10 The 2014 report 
on the “State of democracy, human rights and the 
rule of law in Europe” noted that some states restrict 
the watchdog functions of NGOs by “curtailing their 
existence or activities with excessive formalities, finan-
cial reporting obligations, limits on foreign funding, 
and sanctions”.
MEASUREMENT CRITERIA
 3  Freedom of association is guaranteed by the 
state and can be exercised freely by everyone.
 3  An enabling legal and social environment is in 
place, facilitating and stimulating the existence 
of a vibrant civil society and the effective func-
tioning of NGOs in particular.
 3  Effective and sustainable mechanisms for dia-
logue, consultation and co-operation between 
civil society and the authorities at all levels are 
in place, allowing the participation of all indi-
viduals and societal groups in democratic deci-
sion making.
FINDINGS
■ Even in the absence of systematic and compre-
hensive data, there is sufficient ground to conclude 
some member states perceive civil society organi-
sations as a threat to their security and sovereignty 
and are, as a consequence, restricting their ability to 
contribute to democratic security.
■ On a positive side, a number of member states 
have put in place mechanisms responding to the 
need to involve civil society in social affairs, in deci-
sion making and in conflict resolution or prevention. 
In some countries, the models work reasonably well. 
In others, the model and the institutions for public 
consultation and participation lack effectiveness and 
often exist only as a formality. In the worst cases, 
governments are attempting – through legislation 
and various restrictive practices – to control citizen 
initiatives, including protests.
ENABLING  
CIVIL SOCIETY
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T here is no denying the ever-growing importance of NGOs. These organisations are on voluntary duty in areas torn by human conflicts, natural 
disasters and societal upheavals. Still, the legal status 
of NGOs is uncertain and imperfect. The quest by NGOs 
for recognition of their status under international 
law arose several decades ago. By adopting the 1956 
Hague Convention on the recognition of the legal 
personality of foreign companies, associations and 
foundations, the international community recognised 
the need for such organisations. However, this con-
vention never entered into force since governments 
were more than hesitant to give effect to this private 
international law instrument.
■ Nowadays, NGOs in Europe have legal sta-
tus11 and are established in society; their rights are 
guaranteed by Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. But the recognition of 
NGOs does not always guarantee them the necessary 
protection. Legal guarantee is a fundamental condi-
tion for NGOs exercising their democratic functions. 
However, it appears to be increasingly under threat.
MEASUREMENT CRITERIA
 3  An appropriate legal basis for registering NGOs 
is available.
 3  The principle of proportionality for any restriction 
on the exercise of freedom of association is 
accompanied by an appropriate procedure.
 3  The applicable law is interpreted in favour of the 
founding and effectiveness of NGOs.
 3  Judicial review of refusals to register or of dis- 
solutions of NGOs is provided for in law.
FINDINGS
■ The legislation of a vast majority of member 
states meets the international legal standards for the 
registration and functioning of NGOs. However, a num-
ber of recent government decisions have provoked 
serious concerns with regard to the legal status and 
protection of a number of NGOs in some countries 
in Europe.
■ In an October 2014 opinion on Regulating 
Political Activities of Non-Governmental Organisations, 
the Expert Council on NGO Law of the Council of 
Europe Conference of INGOs (International NGOs) 
warned that: “Legislation currently drafted or adopted 
(…) in some member states of the Council of Europe 
reduces the possibility for active engagement of 
non-governmental organisations.” The introduction 
of new or amended laws restricting or prohibiting 
activities or even closing non-governmental organi-
sations, provokes serious concerns for human rights 
defenders.12 
■ Serious concerns about the free functioning 
of NGOs in certain countries in Europe have been 
expressed by Council of Europe bodies, by local NGOs 
and by international observers, including watchdog 
organisations. According to the Venice Commission, 
laws prohibiting the free functioning of NGOs are likely 
to have a damaging effect on civil society, especially 
on those associations that are devoted to key issues 
such as human rights, democracy and the rule of law.13
ENSURING LEGAL 
GUARANTEE FOR 
NGO FOUNDATION 
AND EXISTENCE
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EUROPE-WIDE
 3  The Council of Europe should prepare new guidelines to ensure meaningful civil 
participation in political decision making, based on best practice and shared 
standards.
 3  Building on the work begun by the Committee of Ministers – following the 
thematic debate on the “role and functioning of NGOs in the Council of Europe” 
– our own practices should be updated to ensure a greater voice for civil society 
within the Organisation through regular and formal opportunities to engage with 
the Committee of Ministers. This should also help to provide a clearer picture on 
the state of civil society, freedom of assembly and freedom of association across 
member states in order to identify appropriate policy responses.
 3  In consultation with the INGO Conference, the Secretary General will revise the 
guidelines on the participatory status for INGOs within the Council of Europe, and 
propose any necessary amendments to the rules.
NATIONAL
The Council of Europe’s bilateral work with member states, including through action 
plans, will aim to:
 3  align legislation, regulations and practice relating to peaceful assemblies and 
public events with the Council of Europe standards and requirements as set out 
in Article 11 of the ECHR and the case law of the Court;
 3  ensure active civil participation in decision-making processes, with formal 
safeguards in place in line with Council of Europe standards;
 3  ensure that NGOs enjoy clear and consistent legal status allowing them to perform 
their democratic functions.
PROPOSED ACTIONS  
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
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INTRODUCTION
Chapter 4 – Functioning of democratic institutions
D emocratic security needs well-functioning democratic institutions, respectful of international principles and standards. Free and fair elections, a functioning opposition, the separation of powers, the vertical distribution of powers and good governance are the basic criteria for assessing the functioning of 
democratic institutions.
■ In spite of the absence of a codified and comprehensive definition of democracy and democratic insti-
tutions, a considerable number of Council of Europe principles and standards can be used to evaluate perfor-
mance in these areas.1 However, on the basis of the information available and the sizeable gaps which exist, it 
is extremely difficult to make accurate comparative assessments across member states. As a result, the findings 
in this chapter have not been quantified; they rather highlight key challenges based on the available evidence.2
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F ree and fair elections are the mechanism for appointing legitimate governments. Not only do they represent the culmination of a participa-
tive political process, elections also drive democratic 
debate, giving political parties the opportunity to 
present alternative visions for their society in a genuine 
competition of ideas.
■ Based on Article 3 of the Protocol to the European 
Convention on Human Rights, the member states of 
the Council of Europe have undertaken to hold free 
elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under 
conditions which will ensure the free expression of the 
opinion of all people in the choice of the legislature.
MEASUREMENT CRITERIA
 3  Universal suffrage: subject to the conditions of 
age (and possibly residence, in particular related 
to local elections and limited exceptions to the 
right to vote), all nationals have the right to vote 
and to stand for election; electoral registers are 
public, permanent and updated at least once a 
year; the registration process is guided by an 
administrative or judicial procedure; and candi-
date registration is governed by clear rules and 
does not impose excessive requirements.
 3  Equal suffrage: each voter has the same number 
of votes, seats are evenly distributed between 
constituencies and equality of opportunity is guar-
anteed for parties and candidates alike through 
the election campaign, media coverage and the 
public funding of parties and campaigns.
FREE AND  
FAIR ELECTIONS
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 3  Free suffrage: voters can freely form an opinion, 
they are offered a genuine choice at the ballot 
box and they can vote freely – in particular, they 
are not threatened with violence at the polls. 
The counting takes places in a transparent way 
and the announced result corresponds to the 
votes cast.
 3  Secret suffrage: voting is individual; no link can 
be established between the content of a vote 
and the identity of the voter who casts it.
 3  Direct suffrage: at least one chamber of the 
national legislature, subnational legislative bod-
ies – if any – and local councils are elected directly.
 3  Elections are held at regular intervals.
 3  Rules of electoral law have at least the rank of a 
statute, and the fundamental elements of elec-
toral law are not open to amendment less than 
one year before an election.
 3  An impartial body is in charge of organising 
elections and central electoral commissions are 
independent. Where governmental or mixed 
models of electoral management are in place, 
the same guiding principles (impartiality, trans-
parency, integrity, professionalism) have to be 
applied in order to ensure the legitimacy and 
credibility of electoral processes. Where central 
electoral commissions are permanent, an effec-
tive system of appeal for electoral matters is in 
place, and national and international observers 
are given the widest possible opportunity to 
participate in an election observation exercise.
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FINDINGS
■ In general, elections held in Europe can be con-
sidered free and fair. However, no country can claim 
that it fully observes all the indicators identified above.
■ Key problems concern a lack of a level playing 
field between contestants. Where adequate finan-
cial campaign regulations are not in place, a lack of 
transparency on party funding may result in cases of 
misuse of administrative resources, unduly benefiting 
incumbent candidates.
■ Major concerns arise as a result of the worsening 
conditions of the electoral process recently experi-
enced in some member states. Recently held state 
elections have shown increasing limitations on the 
freedoms of expression, assembly and association 
resulting from a restrictive media environment and 
voter intimidation. These restrictions have prevented 
electorates from enjoying a genuine choice of political 
alternatives.3 There have also been cases of excessive 
restrictions on the right to vote4 and even on the right 
to free elections,5 as well as inequalities between 
constituencies,6 which harm the principles of universal 
equality of the right to vote.
■ In some cases, the absence of a proper system 
of complaints and appeals has been problematic. 
Additionally, regional conflicts, including protracted 
conflicts, can prevent the conduct of free and fair 
elections in these regions.
■ Finally, even in countries where the election 
administration proves to be professional and there 
is a high level of trust in the integrity of the electoral 
process, overall turnout in elections is decreasing. This 
is particularly important for certain categories of voters, 
such as women, national minorities and young people.
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“All countries have a parliament, but only 
democracies have an opposition.”7
T he opposition carries out several functions which are essential for the effective functioning of dem-ocratic institutions and which enhance the sta-
bility, legitimacy, accountability and transparency 
of the political system as a whole. These functions 
include: enabling fair parliamentary decision-making 
procedures, scrutinising the legislative and budgetary 
proposals of the government and overseeing the 
government and the administration.
■ Furthermore, the opposition offers the prospect 
of political change by democratic means: by its very 
existence it contributes to political pluralism and, 
through its active participation in parliamentary life, 
enables citizens to have a real and informed choice 
at election time.
■ The extent to which the parliamentary oppo-
sition is allowed to fulfil these functions is a sign of 
the level of maturity of a democracy. If none of these 
functions are fulfilled, it is a sign of a dysfunctional 
democracy.
MEASUREMENT CRITERIA
 3  Existence of a legal framework for the protection 
of the rights of the opposition: the way in which 
the rights of the parliamentary opposition are 
protected varies from country to country. Only 
a few countries explicitly define the role or status 
of the opposition in their constitutions, laws or 
regulations. Opposition members may have 
specific rights, as embedded in legal frameworks 
or parliamentary customs.
THE ROLE OF  
THE OPPOSITION
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 3  Positions are reserved for the opposition: one 
of the most common rights is that certain posi-
tions should be reserved for opposition members. 
This applies especially to the chairmanship of 
committees responsible for supervision and 
scrutiny of government activities (for instance, 
budget, immunities or enquiry committees), 
based on the idea that parliamentary oversight 
of the executive is first and foremost a function 
that the opposition parties can be relied on to 
exercise.
 3  Impartiality of the president of parliament: the 
president or speaker of a parliament is the first 
guarantor of the rights of the opposition. In order 
to ensure equality of treatment between mem-
bers of the ruling and opposition parties, the 
president or speaker must be impartial in exer-
cising his or her functions.
 3  Constructive participation in parliamentary work 
by the opposition: the opposition has the right 
to oppose the views and proposals of the ruling 
parties/the government, and in some situations 
it can block decisions even when it is in a minority 
(for instance, when a qualified majority is 
required). However, the opposition has to strike 
a balance between scoring points against its 
opponents and the protection of the public 
interest.
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 3  Rights and responsibilities of the opposition: it 
is not possible to separate the rights of the oppo-
sition from its responsibilities. Ensuring oversight 
of the government and scrutinising the work of 
other key institutions, initiating and participating 
in the legislative process and participating in 
the functioning of parliament are rights that 
must be protected.
 3  Pluralist representativeness of parliaments: the 
effectiveness of parliaments as democratic insti-
tutions depends on their ability to serve as a 
platform for dialogue between different political 
forces. In some Council of Europe member states, 
this function is impaired because of a lack of 
pluralist representation.
 3  Inclusive political process: enjoying a large major-
ity does not absolve a ruling party or coalition 
from the obligation of seeking an inclusive polit-
ical process, particularly when tackling funda-
mental reforms, and to respect and accommo-
date minority views and interests.
FINDINGS
■ There is no common European model when 
it comes to regulating parliamentary opposition. It 
should be underscored that the Venice Commission 
does not consider it necessary or appropriate to try 
to formulate one; what is essential is that the basic 
legal requirements for an effective parliamentary 
opposition are protected in such a way that it cannot 
be overruled or set aside by a simple majority.
■ In some Council of Europe member states,8 oppo-
sition parties have systematically, or for a protracted 
period of time, boycotted parliament. This boycott has 
sometimes stalled parliamentary activity and delayed 
the adoption of important reforms. It has also led to 
the further deterioration of an already tense political 
climate, especially when they do not recognise the 
legitimacy of the parliamentary elections and do not 
accept their mandates.
■ In some countries, the limited representativeness 
of parliament has been identified as a concern, as has 
the existence of a fragmented opposition unable to 
present a viable government.
■ The lack of an inclusive political process involving 
the opposition in key state reforms has raised serious 
concerns. Both the Parliamentary Assembly9 and the 
Venice Commission10 have criticised this course of 
action.
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T he principle of separation of powers means that legislative, executive and judicial power within a state is vested in distinct institutions. Since the 
18th century, the purpose of the separation of powers 
has been to prevent a concentration of powers in 
the executive branch which could become a threat 
to democracy.
MEASUREMENT CRITERIA
 3  The judiciary has to be independent from 
the executive and also legislative power (see 
Chapter 1).
 3  The legislature and the executive branch are 
clearly separate. While a fairly strict separation 
of powers is typical for presidential systems, in 
practically all Council of Europe member states 
the government is elected by and responsible 
before parliament. In a parliamentary system, 
the parliamentary majority supports the exec-
utive and supervision is exercised by the par-
liamentary minority, the media and public 
opinion.
SEPARATION OF POWERS
Chapter 4 – Functioning of democratic institutions
 3  The norm-giving powers of the executive are 
limited to duly justified urgent cases or are based 
on a specific authorisation by the legislature as 
provided for in the constitution.
 3  The right of legislative initiative is granted to 
members of parliament or parliamentary groups.
 3  Parliament has sufficient powers to supervise 
the executive; for example, through the use of 
parliamentary questions, interpellations and 
enquiry committees.
 3  Parliament has to have the right to adopt and 
amend the budget.
 3  Parliament plays a key role in the constitutional 
amendment process and the executive cannot 
bypass parliament in this respect by direct 
recourse to a referendum.
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FINDINGS
■ The application of the principle of separation 
of powers therefore depends on the political sys-
tem, making it difficult to draw meaningful compar-
isons. It is difficult to identify common benchmarks. 
Nevertheless, in all systems the rights of parliament 
with respect to the executive as the stronger power 
have to be protected.
■ Most of the measurement criteria indicated 
above do not give rise to problems in the vast major-
ity of Council of Europe member states. However, 
the lack of a well-functioning system of checks and 
balances has been identified as a problem in some 
member states.11 The Venice Commission has warned, 
for instance, against the excessive use of government 
emergency ordinances and it has been critical of the 
fact that, in some cases, the legislative framework 
for delegating the right of legislative initiative to the 
government is not sufficiently clear. It has also noted 
that the weakness of the supervisory power of par-
liament and the limitations of the budgetary powers 
of parliament can be a threat.12
■ The Venice Commission has also repeatedly 
warned against attempts by the executive to bypass 
parliament in constitutional amendment processes in 
some member states, by direct recourse to referenda 
which were subsequently not implemented.
■ In a number of Council of Europe member states, 
the role of parliament as a counterweight to the execu-
tive power is not always well established. This weakness 
may be due to a variety of factors, including shortcom-
ings in the constitutional framework, as well as the lack 
of the necessary structures, staff and legal expertise.13 
State of democracy, human rights and the rule of law in Europe  Page 66
A balanced, vertical distribution of powers is of paramount importance for creating democratic societies: “sustainable communities, where peo-
ple like to live and work, now and in the future”.14 A 
balanced distribution of powers represents an essen-
tial component of checks and balances; strong local 
and regional government brings democracy closer to 
the people, thereby enhancing democratic security.
MEASUREMENT CRITERIA
 3  The principle of local self-government is recog-
nised in the constitution or at least in law.
 3  Local authorities regulate and manage a sub-
stantial part of public affairs, and local authorities 
are elected directly.
 3  Basic competences are provided for in the con-
stitution or in law; local authorities can exercise 
any initiative which is not excluded from their 
competence; public responsibilities are exercised 
by authorities who are closest to citizens; powers 
given to local authorities are full and exclusive 
or delegated powers; local authorities can adapt 
their exercises to local conditions; local author-
ities are consulted on decisions affecting them.
 3  Local boundaries are not changed without the 
prior consultation of concerned authorities, if 
possible by referendum.
VERTICAL DISTRIBUTION 
OF POWERS
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 3  Administrative supervision is only exercised 
according to law.
 3  Local authorities have adequate resources of 
their own and of which they can dispose freely; 
financial resources are commensurate with 
responsibilities.
 3  Local authorities can form consortia for tasks of 
common interest.
 3  Local authorities have the right of recourse to 
judicial remedy.
FINDINGS
■ The fact that all 47 Council of Europe mem-
ber states, including small states, have ratified the 
European Charter of Local Self-Government may be 
indicative of the fact that subsidiarity has become an 
essential component of the democratic and admin-
istrative fabric of modern European democracy.15 
Practically all the countries where the level of decen-
tralisation may be judged as unsatisfactory in the light 
of the criteria above are currently working on reforms 
to improve their situation.
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■ However, the Congress of Local and Regional 
Authorities has identified the limitation of compe-
tences devolved to local authorities and the lack 
of precision in defining and allocating powers and 
responsibilities between tiers of government as 
recurrent problems.16 It also believes that financial 
arrangements are sometimes not commensurate 
with the tasks devolved, the levels of locally collected 
tax revenue are low and local authorities may not 
be able to spend their resources freely. Other recur-
rent issues often criticised by the Congress during 
its monitoring exercise include the lack of adequate 
consultation mechanisms for governments to consult 
local authorities on matters concerning them and the 
ineffectiveness of judicial remedies at their disposal.
■ In the aftermath of the financial and economic 
crisis, several European countries have taken backward 
steps and have limited to a certain extent the auton-
omy (in particular financial) of local (and sometimes 
regional) authorities. While financial discipline is part 
of good governance at all levels, the crisis should 
not serve as a pretext to curb the very useful reform 
trend of bringing decision making and services closer 
to citizens.
■ Another tendency is the call for decentralisation 
and regionalisation in several parts of Europe. Regional 
government has an important place in many Council 
of Europe member states, in particular the larger ones; 
such calls should be treated with calm and should 
serve as a catalyst for an open dialogue rather than 
for threats or confrontation. Open dialogue on further 
transfer of competences and resources to regional 
authorities, possibly on an asymmetric model, can be 
a solution to problems appearing in many countries.
■ Several states have either implemented or are 
considering implementing territorial reforms of their 
second or third tiers of government. Such reforms may 
be useful in order to ensure efficiency and stream-
line public administration; they should, however, be 
conducted in full compliance with the international 
obligations of the member state.
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A peaceful society is based on effective state institutions. Good governance in this sense means the existence of effective and efficient 
structures, which provide optimal support to citizens 
to live a safe and productive life in line with their 
expectations and opportunities.
■ “Effective democracy and good governance at all 
levels are essential for preventing conflicts, promoting 
stability, facilitating economic and social progress and 
hence for creating sustainable communities where 
people want to live and work, now and in the future.” 17
MEASUREMENT CRITERIA
 3  Openness and transparency: decisions are taken 
and enforced in accordance with rules and reg-
ulations; the public has access to all information 
which is not classified for well-specified reasons; 
information on decisions, policies, implementa-
tion and results is made public.
 3  Innovation and openness to change: new, effi-
cient solutions to problems and improved results 
are sought; modern methods of service delivery 
are tested and applied; and a climate favourable 
to change is created.
 3  Accountability: all decision makers take respon-
sibility for their decisions; decisions are reasoned, 
subject of scrutiny and can be sanctioned; rem-
edies exist for maladministration or wrongful 
decisions.
GOOD GOVERNANCE
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 3  Ethical conduct: public good takes precedence 
over individual interests; effective measures exist 
to prevent/combat corruption.
 3  Responsiveness: objectives, rules, structures and 
procedures seek to meet citizens’ legitimate 
needs and expectations; public services are 
delivered; requests/complaints are dealt with 
within a reasonable timeframe.
 3  Efficiency and effectiveness: results meet agreed 
objectives making the best possible use of 
resources; performance management systems 
and evaluation methods are in place; audits are 
carried out regularly.
 3  Sound financial management: charges meet the 
cost of service provided; budget plans are prepared 
in consultation with the general public or civil 
society; consolidated accounts are published.
 3  Sustainability and long-term orientation: long-
term effects and objectives are duly taken into 
account in policy making, thereby aiming at 
ensuring sustainability of policies in the long 
run.
 3  Competence and capacity: improvement of pro-
fessional skills is encouraged for those who 
deliver governance; public officials are encour-
aged to improve performance; practical meas-
ures and procedures seek to transform skills into 
capacity and improved results.
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FINDINGS
■ In a number of member states, there has been 
significant tension over the implementation of major 
infrastructural projects in the face of persistent or 
unexpected popular opposition. This raises the issue 
of the lawfulness of procedures as opposed to the 
legitimacy of decisions which important segments 
of the population challenge through lawful and not-
so-lawful means.
■ Participation is critical for the sustainability 
of Europe’s political and social fabric and for the 
legitimacy of political institutions, and needs to be 
adequately supported. Falling participation rates in 
elections and loss of trust in the integrity of politi-
cians and democratic procedures, as well as growing 
unwillingness to engage in trade unions and civil 
society organisations, need to be effectively moni-
tored and, where necessary, tackled. In many member 
states efforts have been or are being made to improve 
procedures for public consultation and participa-
tion by citizens and civil society, including the use of 
information technology in relation to e-democracy 
and e-government initiatives. Nevertheless, trends 
in election participation and, more generally, in civic 
and political life should be followed and assessed 
more closely, in order to identify possible obstacles 
to participation and, where necessary, measures to 
strengthen it.
■ Engaging youth in the political process is another 
area where some countries are achieving very prom-
ising results, for example, by lowering the voting age 
and the age at which people can stand for election.
■ The number of member states having ratified 
the Additional Protocol to the European Charter of 
Local Self-Government has significantly increased 
over the last two years. However, no progress has 
been recorded as regards the ratification and entry 
into force of the Council of Europe Convention on 
Access to Official Documents.
■ Since the start of the financial crisis, some mem-
ber states have also implemented reforms aimed at 
streamlining procedures and reducing levels of public 
expenditure, through measures such as professional-
ising public administration, cutting or merging public 
administration bodies and entities, selling public assets, 
externalising services and the public procurement of 
goods and services.
■ Progress has been recorded in a number of coun-
tries as regards the quality and performance of human 
capital in public authorities following the adoption of 
transparent recruitment procedures, the stabilisation 
of the civil service, the introduction of merit-based 
careers and the benchmarking of performance.
■ One area where efforts need to be pursued is 
the fight against corruption in public administration, 
including that at local level.18 In some countries, the 
legal framework for public officials has been expanded 
to include avoidance and management of conflicts of 
interests, declarations of assets, creation of independ-
ent oversight bodies, strict compliance with codes 
of conduct and the protection of whistle-blowers.19
■ Several governments of member states have also 
adopted “open government” policies by making infor-
mation publicly available on recruitment, contracts, 
grants to private companies or individuals and the 
budgets of “quasi non-governmental organisations”, 
among other things.
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EUROPE-WIDE
 3In order to level the playing field between candidates and prevent the misuse of 
administrative resources by incumbents, the Council of Europe should provide 
common guidelines on media coverage and the financing of election campaigns. 
These will allow for greater scrutiny by civil society and raise awareness of the 
problem among all electoral stakeholders.
NATIONAL
The Council of Europe’s bilateral work with member states, including through action 
plans, will aim to:
 3  review existing regulations and practice with regard to financing and running 
election campaigns, as well as the rules governing fair and impartial media 
coverage;
 3  improve the regulatory framework for election observation and enhance the 
capacity for the monitoring of domestic elections;
 3  introduce measures to encourage the participation of women, minorities and 
young people in the electoral process.
PROPOSED ACTIONS  
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
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INTRODUCTION
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B uilding and reinforcing inclusiveness in our societies – and thereby empowering all citizens to exercise and defend their rights, to value diversity and to play an active part in democratic life – is an essential element of democratic security.
■ All states need to intensify their efforts to anticipate and pre-empt divisions within our societies, and 
prevent their development into tensions and conflicts. Anti-discrimination, integration, education, youth and 
social policies are fundamental to developing an understanding of “democratic culture”. This has become all 
the more crucial as Europe continues to deal with the fallout of the economic crisis, and with populism and 
extremism on the rise.
■ Inclusive societies enable all their members to enjoy their fundamental rights, including their economic 
and social rights. They offer equal opportunities to all, and notably to young people, to participate and to 
contribute to community development. In inclusive societies prejudice and discrimination have no place and 
action is taken to build trust among citizens across social and cultural divides.
■ Legal protection of social rights, effective social rights enforcement, quality of anti-discrimination meas-
ures, the standards and mechanisms of integration policies, access to rights for young people and education 
for democratic citizenship, are the basic criteria for assessing the degree to which states promote inclusion 
and democratic citizenship.
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A lthough embodied in the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights along with civil and political rights, economic and 
social rights suffer from weaker protections. These 
weaknesses have been exposed and exacerbated 
by the economic turmoil that has engulfed Europe 
in recent years.
■ An essential step in guaranteeing social rights, 
such as the rights to housing, health care and educa-
tion, is ensuring that they are properly protected at 
national level, in particular through the constitution 
and subsequent legislation.
■ Shared international standards support this. The 
main treaty on social rights in Europe is the European 
Social Charter, which opened for signature in Turin on 
18 October 1961 and was revised in 1996. It represents 
the social constitution of Europe and is an essential 
component of the continent’s human rights architec-
ture. It consists of an integrated system of guarantees, 
the implementation of which at national level has the 
potential to reduce economic and social tensions by 
contributing to a greater sense of fairness among 
individuals and groups.
■ Political systems seen to protect social rights are 
likely to command greater levels of public confidence. 
In addition, the cohesive quality of these rights has 
taken on a new importance against a backdrop of 
ongoing austerity, rising populism and in the fight 
against violent extremism and radicalisation. By pro-
moting equal opportunity, social rights encourage 
individuals to remain within mainstream society and 
help lessen the appeal of other, more extreme or 
divisive paths.
■ To achieve this, the Turin process promotes 
the reinforcement and a greater acceptance of the 
normative system of the Charter, as well as a better 
implementation of the provisions of this key Council 
of Europe treaty.
■ In this context, a specific dimension is the chang-
ing relationship between the law of the European 
Union and the Charter. There is an urgent need to 
enhance existing synergies and find effective solu-
tions to the limited – but existing and emerging – 
conflicts. It must be ensured that the fundamental 
rights enshrined in the Charter are fully respected by 
decisions or legislation of the states parties resulting 
directly or indirectly from changes in EU law. To that 
effect, co-operation between competent Council 
of Europe and EU bodies, with a view to promoting 
the harmonisation of the two normative systems in 
order to improve states’ abilities to comply with their 
international obligations, should be reinforced.
LEGAL PROTECTION 
OF SOCIAL RIGHTS
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MEASUREMENT CRITERIA
Domestic law
 3  Constitutional set of rights.
 3  Statutory law or other binding texts.
European law
 3  Ratification of the European Social Charter in its 
revised version.
 3  Adoption of a significant number of provisions, 
including key provisions, of the Charter.
 3  Acceptance of the collective complaints 
procedure.
LEGAL PROTECTION OF SOCIAL RIGHTS
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FINDINGS
■ Some 33 member states have ratified the revised 
text of the 1961 European Social Charter and 15 
member states have so far accepted the collective 
complaints procedure of the Charter. Where states 
have not ratified the Charter, they may nonetheless 
guarantee social rights at domestic level. However, 
their abstention from the treaty undermines the collec-
tive human rights mission and reduces the collective 
pressure on all member states to meet shared values 
and international standards.
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T he aim and purpose of the European Social Charter is to protect rights, not only theoretically but also in practice. The implementation of the 
Charter requires the states to not only take legal action 
but also to undertake practical action to give full effect 
to the rights recognised in the Charter. In particular, 
it requires informed decisions on the allocation of 
available public resources. This should be done in 
compliance with the principles of freedom and justice.
■ In addition, any policies aimed at implementing 
social rights must be assessed to ensure that, in prac-
tice, they are promoting genuine fairness, equality 
and non-discrimination.
■ Inclusive societies can be realised only through 
legal and social empowerment. In this respect, all the 
rights proclaimed by the Charter must be mobilised. 
Particular attention should be drawn on the right to 
housing, the right to health and the right to educa-
tion. In addition, specific rights for the elderly and for 
people with disabilities constitute essential factors of 
social inclusion.
■ Moreover, the right to organise and the right 
to bargain collectively are essential components of 
democratic citizenship. Employment, as a result of the 
right to work and fair working conditions, including 
fair remuneration, are imperative, and come under 
threat in times of crisis.
■ The European Committee of Social Rights has 
made it very clear that the parties have accepted to 
pursue, by all appropriate means, the attainment of 
conditions in which, among other things, the right to 
health, the right to social security, the right to social 
and medical assistance and the right to benefit from 
social welfare services may be effectively realised. The 
economic crisis – a time when beneficiaries need the 
protection most – should not have as a consequence 
the reduction of the protection of the rights recognised 
by the Charter.
■ At a time when there is a growing number of 
people in Europe deprived of dignity because of their 
exclusion from society, specific importance should 
be attributed to the protection against poverty and 
social exclusion.
EFFECTIVE SOCIAL 
RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT
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MEASUREMENT CRITERIA
 3  The number of findings of non-conformity by 
the European Committee of Social Rights.
 3  The types of findings (rights concerned, duration 
of the violation, number of people affected and 
consequences for those concerned).
 3  The enforcement of rights through domestic 
courts.
EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF SOCIAL RIGHTS
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FINDINGS
■ The majority of member states are complying 
with the European Social Charter and its revised text. 
For some specific countries however, the European 
Committee of Social Rights1 has adopted a significant 
number of conclusions of non-conformity with the 
Charter compared with the total number of accepted 
provisions.2
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T he quality of anti-discrimination measures depends on effective national legislation pro-hibiting and punishing discriminatory acts and 
on the existence of a well-functioning mechanism to 
promote and enforce the right to non-discrimination. 
The aim of the prohibition of discrimination is that 
human difference in a democratic society should be 
viewed positively but should also be responded to 
with discernment in order to ensure real and effective 
equality.
■ Protocol No. 12 to the European Convention 
on Human Rights prohibits discrimination on any 
ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, birth 
or other status. The prohibition of discrimination as 
defined in the Convention and in the European Social 
Charter must apply to all public authorities as well as 
all natural and legal persons, both in the public and 
private sectors, in all areas of life, including employ-
ment, education, housing, health, social protection 
and public services. Easily accessible judicial and/or 
administrative proceedings should be available as 
well as effective sanctions including compensation 
for material and moral damages to victims.
■ The European Commission against Racism and 
Intolerance (ECRI) has set out, in its General Policy 
Recommendation No. 7, minimum standards for 
national legislation to combat racism and racial dis-
crimination effectively, including provisions in all 
branches of the law – the constitution, civil, admin-
istrative and criminal.3 This integrated approach en- 
ables the problems to be addressed in an exhaustive, 
consistent and complementary manner.
■ Criminal law has a symbolic effect which raises 
society’s awareness of the seriousness of racism and 
may have a dissuasive effect. Ideally, racist motivation 
should constitute an aggravating circumstance for all 
criminal offences.
■ Two of ECRI’s General Policy Recommendations 
(Nos. 2 and 7) call for the setting up of specialised bod-
ies to combat racism and discrimination at national 
level and provide guidance on the powers and func-
tioning of such bodies. Importantly, they should 
operate without state interference and with all the 
guarantees necessary for their independence.
■ Homophobic and transphobic attitudes have 
been identified in all 47 member states, though 
attitudes vary significantly among and within the 
countries.4
MEASUREMENT CRITERIA
Legal criteria
 3  Ratification of Protocol No. 12 to the European 
Convention on Human Rights and of the 
European Social Charter in its revised version.
 3  National criminal law punishes: public incitement 
to violence, hatred or discrimination on the 
grounds ECRI has established; public insults and 
defamation; threats; the public expression of an 
ideology which claims the superiority of, or 
which depreciates or denigrates, a group of 
persons; the creation or leadership of, support 
for or participation in, a group which promotes 
racism.
 3  National legislation provides for an obligation 
to suppress public financing of organisations 
which promote racism, as well as the possibility 
of dissolution of such organisations.
 3  Civil and administrative law prohibits direct and 
indirect racial discrimination and segregation; 
it provides for the sharing of the burden of proof 
in discrimination cases.
QUALITY OF  
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION 
MEASURES
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Institutional criteria
 3  National specialised bodies’ powers include: 
assistance to victims; investigation powers; the 
right to initiate and participate in court proceed-
ings; monitoring legislation and advice to legis-
lative and executive authorities; and awareness 
raising.
 3  National specialised bodies have the freedom 
to appoint their own staff and to manage their 
resources.
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION MEASURES
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FINDINGS
■ Whereas several member states already have 
sufficient anti-discrimination-related legislation or 
implement measures to combat different types of dis-
crimination, gaps and loopholes in anti-discrimination 
legislation are still notable, especially in specific areas 
like racism and racial discrimination and employment 
discrimination, in particular on the grounds of age, sex-
ual orientation or disability.5 In addition, some mem-
ber states are completely lacking non-discrimination 
legislation in the field of civil and administrative law.6 
■ In cases where there exists a specialised body to 
combat discrimination, often this body is dysfunctional 
or lacks independence, power, sufficient resources or 
even a clear mandate.
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E urope is built on the diversity of distinct cultural, religious and social traditions embodied in the cultures of its countries. It is home to people of 
many different racial, ethnic, religious and national 
backgrounds, and its economy and cultures have 
been enriched by the contributions of migrants from 
around the globe. In an increasingly globalised world, 
migratory movements will continue to shape European 
society. However, migration in Europe is often crim- 
inalised and has severe implications for human rights.7 
■ As stated in the Secretary General’s first report, 
unfortunately people with a different ethnic, religious 
or linguistic backgrounds often perform less well 
than the majority. Frequently they enjoy economic, 
social and political rights to a lesser degree, leading 
to segregation and the emergence of parallel soci-
eties, and sometimes contributing to radicalisation 
and extremism.
■ To redress this, successful integration policies are 
needed.8 ECRI, in its fifth cycle of country monitoring, 
is examining whether and to what extent member 
states have developed such policies, whether these 
cover all vulnerable groups (people with migrant 
backgrounds as well as historical ethnic, religious and 
linguistic minorities) and what impact they have had.9 
ECRI takes into account standards set by the Council 
of Europe and other international organisations, as 
well as its own General Policy Recommendations in 
the fields of education, employment, anti-Semitism, 
anti-Gypsyism and combating intolerance against 
Muslims, among others.
■ As it is difficult to design and implement effec-
tive policies without quality data, ECRI insists that 
states should develop integration indicators. Properly 
designed, effectively implemented and scrupulously 
monitored integration policies promote inclusive 
societies. Integration is a two-way process; it not only 
requires efforts from those belonging to vulnerable 
groups but the majority also has a contribution to 
make and needs to open up to diversity. By address-
ing the problems related to social divisions and by 
preventing the emergence of new ones, good inte-
gration policies contribute to democratic security on 
our continent.
MEASUREMENT CRITERIA
 3  Integration policies are comprehensive or 
fragmentary.
 3  Integration policies are coherent.
 3  Integration policies make use of good integration 
indicators to fix objectives.
 3  Integration policies are subject to regular 
evaluation.
 3  The results of integration policies in core areas 
such as educational outcome or labour market 
participation.
INTEGRATION POLICIES: 
STANDARDS AND 
MECHANISMS
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FINDINGS
■ Many member states face intolerance and inte-
gration problems due to historical, ethnic, political and 
religious reasons; the integration and stigmatisation 
of Roma and other ethnic groups, migrants and even 
LGBT persons remains a weak point in some countries. 
Often these countries lack political efforts to solve this 
situation in a sustainable manner, in areas like housing, 
schooling and employment. Recent events have shown 
that past policies on integration have not always been 
successful and have aggravated the situation, so that 
INTEGRATION POLICY STANDARDS
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new integration policies are currently underway or 
have been recently put in place. In a few member 
states, no coherent and comprehensive integration 
plan or policy has been deployed at all, while some 
other member states have already implemented an 
adapted all-encompassing integration strategy or are 
undertaking necessary steps towards policies and 
action plans on migration and integration.
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Y oung people in Europe continue to be particularly affected by the economic and social difficulties facing many European societies: unemployment, 
precariousness, discrimination and social exclusion are 
a reality for many of them. The sustainability of society 
relies on the creativity, dynamism, social commitment 
and competences of young people.
■ Young people are entitled to the full respect, 
protection and promotion of their human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. Youth policy has the respon-
sibility to facilitate young people’s access to human 
and social rights which they are entitled to enjoy as 
full citizens and which are guaranteed by international 
treaties.
■ Action in the field of youth work, education and 
training should encourage the exchange of experience 
between young people of different backgrounds. In 
policy making, young people with diverse and minor-
ity backgrounds must be involved and integrated 
in policy formulation and implementation, and the 
self-representation of minority groups, particularly in 
decision-making bodies, should be reinforced.
■ In a context of ageing societies and the weak-
ening of the welfare state, social policies may tend to 
neglect the needs of young people, especially as far 
as social welfare contributions and benefits are con-
cerned. The European Social Charter is an important 
reference framework for youth policy. In turn, youth 
policy can support the implementation of elements 
of the Charter particularly relevant to young people, 
like health, education, employment, housing, free 
movement and mobility, and non-discrimination.
MEASUREMENT CRITERIA
Human rights and democracy
 3  Youth policy aims at enabling young people to 
accede to their rights, including by facilitating 
access to information and counselling services.
 3  Appropriate structures and mechanisms are 
established at local, regional and national levels 
to enable active participation of young people, 
such as youth parliaments, independent youth 
councils and support to youth NGOs and 
networks.
 3  Youth policy seeks to effectively implement gen-
der equality and prevent all forms of gender-based 
violence.
Living together in diverse societies
 3  Youth policy aims at empowering young people 
to promote, in their daily lives, cultural diversity 
as well as intercultural dialogue and 
co-operation.
 3  Preventing and counteracting all forms of racism 
and discrimination on any ground constitute a 
clear priority of youth policy.
 3  Youth policy supports initiatives of young people 
and their organisations with regard to conflict 
prevention and management, as well as 
post-conflict reconciliation.
ACCESS TO RIGHTS 
FOR YOUNG PEOPLE
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Promoting social inclusion 
of young people
 3  Youth policy has a special focus on supporting 
the integration of excluded young people.
 3  Concrete measures and tools are established in 
order to facilitate access to non-formal education 
and youth work, as means of facilitating auton-
omy and transition from education to 
employment.
 3  Youth policy seeks to support young people’s 
autonomy, as well as their access to decent living 
conditions.
 3  Youth mobility programmes are developed as 
tools for supplementing young people’s educa-
tion and training.
FINDINGS
■ To date, no monitoring mechanisms are available 
to thoroughly assess the implementation of national 
youth policies or the enforcement of relevant legisla-
tion, including Council of Europe recommendations. 
The youth sector has developed a number of meth-
odologies and tools of a non-binding nature, such 
as international reviews of national youth policies, 
youth policy advisory missions, peer coaching, etc. 
These fragmented data do not allow the presentation 
of country-based evaluation reports for all member 
states. It can however be observed that a coherent 
governmental approach towards young people is 
present in only a few member states.
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T he pace and scale of intolerance, radicalisation and violence in Europe today demands an urgent response, and education has an important role 
to play in this respect. Preparation of learners for life 
as active and responsible citizens, able to enjoy their 
fundamental rights and exercise their duties while 
effectively participating in democratic and complex 
societies, is one of the main features of quality educa-
tion, in formal and non-formal settings, which should 
be enjoyed by everyone.
■ Monitoring reports and the results of other rele-
vant Council of Europe assessments draw attention to 
the need to ensure that all children have equal access 
to quality education, regardless of their ethnic origins 
or immigration status or those of their parents, and 
to the promotion of equal opportunities in schools. 
Quality education provides a secure, non-violent and 
inclusive learning environment in which the rights 
of all are respected and everyone’s participation in 
decision making is facilitated and supported, therefore 
contributing to the prevention of extremism and rad-
icalisation. Teachers should be well equipped to deal 
with controversial issues at school in a constructive 
way: when discriminatory approaches are endorsed 
or tolerated, and when children do not have a sense 
of belonging, there is a high risk of exclusion, radical-
isation and violence.10 
■ Country monitoring reports suggest there are 
still large gaps in the promotion of knowledge and 
awareness of diversity in contemporary societies, in 
the combating of all forms of intolerance, racism, xen-
ophobia and nationalism, and in strengthening social 
cohesion and developing a culture of co-operation. 
Attention is also drawn to the need to help migrants 
with a poor level of education to attain a sufficient 
level of integration and to monitor trends regarding 
hindrance based on a lack of language proficiency for 
integration. For the most vulnerable learners, those 
who use a different language for day-to-day commu-
nication and, especially, learners from disadvantaged 
socio-economic or migrant backgrounds, acquiring 
the language of schooling is a major challenge.
MEASUREMENT CRITERIA
 3  Quality education is ensured without discrimi-
nation on any grounds.
 3  Measures have been taken to guarantee equal 
opportunities for access to education at all levels 
while paying particular attention to vulnerable 
groups.
 3  Specific action has been taken to increase the 
level of priority of education for democratic 
citizenship and human rights in education pol-
icies, including provision of adequate resources.
EDUCATION FOR 
DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP
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 3  Skills for promoting social inclusion, valuing 
diversity and handling differences and conflict 
are part of the teachers’ education as well as of 
the teaching and learning process in schools.
 3  Measures are taken in the fields of education 
and research to foster knowledge of the culture, 
history, language and religion of the national 
minorities and of the majority.
 3  Appropriate forms and means for the teaching 
and study of regional or minority languages at 
all appropriate stages are in place.
 3  Positive measures are implemented and assessed 
with regard to the linguistic integration of chil-
dren, adolescents and adults from migrant 
backgrounds.
EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP
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FINDINGS
■ Just over one third of the member states comply 
with the standards and requirements of an inclusive 
educational system that provides access to all children, 
without any distinction based on ethnicity, religion, 
language or ability. 
■ “Inclusive education” is a common theme across the 
legislative frameworks of most member states, but in 
many cases its practical implementation poses prob-
lems, especially where specific education is needed 
(for example, for children with disabilities) or in educa-
tion systems with a religious and ethnic mix. Despite 
progress in this area, less than a quarter of all mem-
ber states still have an educational system excluding 
minorities based on ethnicity, religion or language. 
Roma are systematically segregated, intentionally 
or not, from regular education, preventing a normal 
assimilation into society and causing many to drop 
out. Public awareness of the existence of diversity 
and the need to support vulnerable or disadvantaged 
groups in mainstream education is not yet an issue in 
most member states, and is therefore not translated 
into policies.
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EUROPE-WIDE
 3  Implement the Council of Europe Action Plan to combat terrorism and radicalisation 
leading to terrorism (2015-2017).
 3  Implement the Council of Europe agenda on Roma inclusion (2015-2019), with 
its three priority lines of actions – tackling anti-Roma discrimination, introducing 
innovative models for inclusive policies for the most vulnerable and introduce 
best practices for local-level solutions for the social inclusion of Roma.
 3  Reinforce the follow-up of the decisions and conclusions of the European Committee 
of Social Rights, as provided in the “2014 “Turin Process” Action Plan.
 3  Develop within the Council of Europe modalities for the systematic assessment 
of how national youth policies facilitate young people’s access to rights.
NATIONAL
The Council of Europe’s bilateral work with member states, including through action 
plans, will aim to:
 3  bringing anti-discrimination and integration measures and policies in line with 
relevant Council of Europe standards, notably through the establishment of national 
specialised bodies to combat racism and discrimination and the development of 
comprehensive integration policies;
 3  review and update curricula in line with provisions of the Charter for Education 
for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights and support initiatives for the 
acquisition of competences for democratic culture by all;
 3  ensure implementation of the European Social Charter and a better follow-up of 
the conclusions and decisions of the European Committee of Social Rights;
 3  facilitate the ratification of Protocol No. 12 to the European Convention on Human 
Rights and the revised Charter.
PROPOSED ACTIONS  
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
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1. Conclusions adopted by the European Committee of Social Rights in the period 2011-2014 in the framework of the Charter’s monitoring procedures 
(national reporting and collective complaints). Available at: www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/conclusions/ConclusionsYear_en.asp.
2. European Committee of Social Rights Activity Report 2013, with reference to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Norway, Sweden and Turkey with regards to the 
procedure on non-accepted provisions, p. 38-41. Available at: www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/Presentation/ActivityReport2013_en.pdf.
3. www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/activities/GPR/EN/Recommendation_N7/default_en.asp.
4. www.coe.int/t/Commissioner/Source/LGBT/LGBTStudy2011_en.pdf.
5. See the Venice Commission Opinion on the issue of the prohibition of so-called “propaganda of homosexuality” in the light of recent legislation in 
some Council of Europe member states, with reference to Russia, Ukraine and Moldova, 14-15 June 2013. Available at: www.venice.coe.int/webforms/
documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2013)022-e.
6. ECRI Country Monitoring Work. Available at: www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/activities/countrybycountry_en.asp.
7. See “Criminalisation of Migration in Europe: Human Rights Implications”; issue paper commissioned and published by the Council of Europe 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Comm/DH/IssuePaper(2010)1, 4 February 2010. Available at: https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CommDH/
IssuePaper(2010)1&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&Site=COE&BackColorInternet=DBDCF2&BackColorIntranet=FDC864&BackColorLogged=FDC864.
8. Report “Diversity and Cohesion: new challenges for the integration of immigrants and minorities”, July 2000. Available at: www.coe.int/t/dg3/migration/
archives/documentation/Series_Community_Relations/Diversity_Cohesion_en.pdf.
9. Information document on the fifth monitoring cycle of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), 28 September 2012. Available 
at: www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/activities/Information%20document%20fifth%20monitoring%20cycle_en.pdf.
10. Committee of Ministers Recommendation CM/Rec(2012)13 on ensuring quality education, 12 December 2012. Available at: https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.
jsp?id=2014671&Site=CM.


The Council of Europe is the continent’s 
leading human rights organisation. 
It comprises 47 member states, 28 of which 
are members of the European Union. 
All Council of Europe member states have signed up to 
the European Convention on Human Rights, a treaty designed 
to protect human rights, democracy and the rule of law.
The European Court of Human Rights oversees 
the implementation of the Convention in the member states.
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Democratic security is an old idea, based on the argument that democracies rarely, if ever, 
go to war with each other. Democratic practices equally protect states from internal strife. 
Democratic security is a responsibility which all nations share.
This second annual report on the state of democracy, human rights and the rule of law in 
Europe assesses the capacities of the member states to guarantee and enhance democratic 
security within their borders and, collectively, across the continent. It measures the extent 
to which the Council of Europe’s 47 member states are able to make the five pillars of 
democratic security a reality, namely: an efficient and independent judiciary, freedom 
of expression, freedom of assembly and association, the functioning of democratic 
institutions, and inclusive society and democratic citizenship. The report also draws on the 
Council of Europe’s capacity to monitor and evaluate performance in terms of democracy, 
human rights and rule of law and to identify remedies for shortcomings and provide 
assistance in their implementation.
